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THE PROBLEM CHILD: AN EMPIRICAL
SURVEY AND RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF
CHILD POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
Peter M Cicchino*
INTRODUCTION
Pauper ubique jacet.
In one of the most dramatic moments of Plato's Republic,
Socrates is interrupted and then verbally attacked by a rhetorician
named Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus, who holds the position that
justice "is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger,' '2 has
been "hunched up like a wild beast"3 as Socrates and another of
the dialogue's interlocutors, Polemarchus, have been inquiring into
the notion whether justice is helping friends and injuring enemies.4
Suddenly, Thrasymachus throws himself at Socrates and
Polemarchus, "as if to tear them to pieces."5 Shouting at Socrates,
Thrasymachus demands that Socrates cease questioning others and
provide his own definition of justice for examination.
Thrasymachus, however, imposes a few conditions:
And see to it you don't tell me that it (justice) is the
needful, or the helpful, or the profitable, or the gainful, or
" Director, Lesbian & Gay Youth Project of the Urban Justice Center in New
York City. Harvard Law School, J.D.; Fordham University, M.A.; University of
Scranton, B.S.
' "The poor are everywhere in subjection." Marx attributes these words to
Queen Elizabeth I of England after she had taken a tour of her realm. KARL
MARX, 1 CAPITAL 882 (Ben Fowkes trans., 1976).
2 PLATO, REPUBLIC 338c (H. Bloom trans., 1st ed. 1968).
3 Id. at 335b-c.
4 Id. at 332d.
5Id
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the advantageous; but tell me clearly and precisely what
you mean, for I won't accept such inanities.6
In response, Socrates suggests that speaking about justice without
mentioning any of the topics Thrasymachus has forbidden is like
being asked, "How much is twelve?" without being allowed to
answer "two times six, or three times four, or six times two, or
four times three."7
This scene from the Republic mirrors, in many ways, the
current state of discourse about a wide variety of social issues in
the United States, particularly the problems confronting our
haphazard institutions of poor relief (less accurately, though more
commonly called "welfare")' and our highly punitive methods of
controlling certain types of what is perceived to be anti-social
behavior (less accurately, though more commonly called "criminal
justice").9 So far to the right is the political center, so dominant is
the ideology of the market, that any serious attempt at interjecting
discussion of the structural failings of our economic system; the
debilitating effects of material deprivation on developing minds and
bodies; or the enduring legacy of subordinating people on the basis
6 Id. at 335d.
Id. at 337a-c.
For a description of the confused and inadequate system of poor relief in
this country, see generally FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, REGU-
LATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (2d ed. 1993). The
thesis of Piven and Cloward's book is that public welfare policies (poor relief)
are expanded during times of civil instability, as a means of pacifying unrest, and
are contracted (or abolished) once the crisis appears to have been averted. Id. at
xv. In tracing the development of various types of poor relief in the United
States, Piven and Cloward depict the unsystematic and often ad hoc manner in
which various institutions of poor relief, from alms houses to public assistance
programs, were created by local, state, and federal governments. Chapters three
(on the New Deal and the Social Security Act of 1935), nine, and 10 (on the
Great Society and its programs) are particularly good at illustrating the
compromises, contradictions, and complexities of the various programs that are
supposed to provide assistance to poor people.
9 For informative discussions of the highly punitive trend in local, state, and
federal criminal justice systems, see WENDY KAMINER, IT'S ALL THE RAGE:
CRIME AND CULTURE (1995); THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, THE REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996)
[hereinafter WAR ON CRIME].
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of race, gender, and sexual orientation is dismissed as denying
personal responsibility, or treated as the mindless reaction of an
outdated and knee-jerk liberalism. Indeed, even to use the term
"capitalism" in any context other than to celebrate its unalloyed
triumph over communism is to risk being regarded as an out-of-
touch ideologue or a tired old leftist.'"
Like Socrates, however, we must never stop "plying [our]
thankless elenctic task,"" exposing the ways in which so many of
the evil orthodoxies of our age conflict with our culture's deepest
and best values. This Article is written in that spirit.
Specifically, this Article undertakes both an empirical survey
and rhetorical analysis of the problem of child 2 poverty in the
United States. From an empirical standpoint, the Article examines
the present scope, trends, effects, and causes of child poverty in the
United States. From the standpoint of rhetorical analysis, the
Article considers the various ways in which adherents to the set of
ideas associated with contemporary conservative politics in the
United States respond to the empirical reality of child poverty. This
Article critically evaluates the various attempts of conservatives to
explain the causes of child poverty; discusses some of the policy
proposals that those explanations are meant to justify; and con-
cludes by arguing that child poverty presents a special problem for
the contemporary conservative ideology.
'0 The truncation of discussion about social issues in the United States is
hardly a recent phenomenon, nor is it limited to politicians and ideologues. As
one scholar of poverty and public assistance has put it:
By individualizing poverty, many American social scientists have aided
the mystification of its origins and obscured its politics. In much
American social science, poverty remains profoundly apolitical.
Discussions of how to influence the level of social benefits along a
fairly narrow band of possibilities pass for political discussion. About
the real politics of poverty, American social science remains largely
silent.
MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON WELFARE 237 (1989).
11 GREGORY VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER 234
(1991).
12 Unless indicated otherwise, "child" is meant to designate a person under
the age of 18.
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While conceptually distinguishable, empirical and rhetorical
analyses are interwoven throughout the Article. Each section
considers statistical data relevant to child poverty, while also taking
up the ideological disputes over the meaning of that data. In
presenting the conservative response to the problem of poverty, and
child poverty in particular, the Article attempts to convey not just
the substance, but the rhetoric and tone of the conservative position.
To accomplish that end, the Article frequently quotes from and
offers summaries of the writings of leading proponents of the
conservative position.
The argument has five parts. Part I summarizes current data on
child poverty rates in the United States. Part II analyzes trends in
that data in terms of both the trajectory and demographics of child
poverty rates in this country. Part III undertakes a limited phenom-
enology of child poverty, briefly touching upon some of the most
severe consequences of being young and poor. Part IV examines
competing accounts of the causes of child poverty in the United
States. Finally, this Article concludes that child poverty poses a
particularly unsettling challenge for the conservative position, and
that understanding the problem of child poverty is indispensable for
formulating sound public policy in, among other areas, welfare.
Planning changes in the welfare system without giving careful
attention to the causes and characteristics of child poverty is an
exercise in either stupidity or deception. It is also the dominant
mode of discourse for much of the contemporary discussion
surrounding the so-called "reform" of welfare.
To head off an objection at the start, it should be granted that
the term "conservative," as employed by this Article, suffers from
a certain lack of precision. Indisputably, there are problems with
terms like "conservative" and "liberal." Among the most obvious
of those problems is that the terms change with context. Moreover,
when used to describe political movements or groups of people, the
terms give a false impression of ideological unity. There are, it is
true, economic conservatives who are social liberals and, in the
case of the U.S. Roman Catholic bishops, for example, economic
liberals who are social conservatives.
Other terms, however, are not much better. "Right wing" seems
too disparaging a term and, like "left wing," suffers from the same
inexactness as "conservative" and "liberal." "Market-ideology" may
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be more descriptive, but fails to capture adequately the social
prejudices, moral convictions, and religious beliefs that motivate
many contemporary defenders of capitalism. Additionally, the term
"market-ideology" obscures the fact that, as Noam Chomsky is
fond of pointing out, many of its staunchest defenders believe in
markets only for others and not for themselves.13
The fact, however, is that groups of citizens and groups of
elected representatives do share, to a significant and observable
degree, similar views and basic beliefs about a variety of issues
now under debate. Since talking about those groups and their views
requires using labels, this Article adopts the terms favored by the
groups themselves and readily understood by most Americans.
What this Article henceforth calls the "conservative position"
is the set of beliefs and policy prescriptions supported by the
Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives of the
104th Congress, as well as the majority of Republican governors.
From a purely phenomenological standpoint, the conservative
position can be identified with, inter alia, the lowering of taxes on
the wealthiest citizens; the elimination of most health, safety, and
environmental regulations; the abolition of affirmative action
programs; draconian cuts in public assistance and other social
programs; the expansion of military expenditures from current
levels; the restriction of reproductive rights; hostility to the social
and political equality of gay people; longer sentences for persons
convicted of criminal offenses and greater public expenditures on
prisons. Philosophically, the conservative position is characterized
by a commitment to capitalism (market economics) and, with that,
minimal government regulation of business, maximum deregulation
of the economy, privatization of public services, delegitimation of
any group rights, and a concomitant exaltation of the individual as
economic and political agent.
Ultimately, this Article argues that the reason child poverty
presents such a difficult problem for conservative politics is that the
subjects of child poverty--children-resist the two rhetorical
strategies upon which contemporary conservatives have so heavily
13 See NOAM CHOMSKY, THE PROSPEROUS FEW AND THE RESTLESS MANY
9-14 (1993).
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and effectively relied in the debate over social policy in the United
States: blaming the victim and the perfection of the market.
I. ABSOLUTE AND COMPARATIVE MAGNITUDE OF CHILD
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
Throughout, I work on an assumption that cannot be
proved by Government figures. . . . It is an ethical propo-
sition, and it can be simply stated: In a nation with a
technology that could provide every citizen with a decent
life, it is an outrage and a scandal that there should be such
social misery.
-Michael Harrington 14
According to the most recent estimates of the Census Bureau,
there are approximately 69,277,000 children in the United States,
or about 26% of the total population. 5 The vast majority of those
children (83.7%) are under the age of fourteen. 6 In 1993, slightly
more than one in five children in the United States (22.7%) lived
in poverty, 17 though more recent estimates range between 24%
and 29%.18 The highly respected Luxembourg Income Study puts
the present child poverty rate in the United States at 26%, or
equal to the representation of children in the general population.' 9
14 THE OTHER AMERICA 17 (lst ed. 1964).
" Telephone Interview with United States Bureau of the Census, Populations
Division (July 12, 1996). The total U.S. population is 264,755,000. The child
population breaks down as follows: 19,454,000 (under age five); 19,503,000
(ages five to nine); 19,054,000 (ages 10 to 14); 11,266,000 (ages 15 to 18). Id.
The percentage of the population under 18 years of age has steadily declined
from 40% in 1900, to 36% in 1960, to the present 26%. Robert Pear, Thousands
to Rally in Capital on Children's Behalf, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1996, §1, at 10.
16 Pear, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that 83.7% of children in the United
States are under 18-years-old).
'7 RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., THE WAR ON THE POOR: A DEFENSE MANUAL
27 (1996) (noting that 22.7% of U.S. children lived in poverty in 1993) (citing
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 19 (1995)).
8 Jean Hopfensperger, In France, a Security Blanket for All Families with
Children, STAR TRIB., Apr. 14, 1996, at IA.
'9 Pear, supra note 15, at 10.
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By comparison, the poverty rate for all persons in the United States
in 1993 was approximately 15%.20 In total numbers, children
make up about 40% of all those persons officially defined as poor
in the United States.2'
Relative to other developed nations, the United States experi-
ences significantly higher levels of child poverty or as one
commentator has put it: "When it comes to children, the United
States is the poorest of rich nations., 22 In a 1995 study of
industrialized countries, only Ireland and Israel had child poverty
rates comparable to that of the United States. Fourteen other
nations studied-Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland-had lower rates of child
poverty, some less than one tenth that of the United States. 24 The
same study, conducted three years earlier, had made similar
findings. Then, the United States was found to have a child poverty
rate of approximately 20.4%.25 Canada, at 9.3%, had a child
poverty rate less than half that of the United States.26 Other
western nations had even lower rates: Australia (9%); Britain
(7.4%); France (4.6%); Holland (3.8%); Germany (2.8%); and
Sweden (1.6%).27 The figures are all the more striking in light of
the fact that the United States, with a Gross National Product of
20 URIE BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., THE STATE OF AMERICANS: THE
DISTURBING FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHANGING VALUES, CRIME, THE
ECONOMY, POVERTY, FAMILY, EDUCATION, THE AGING POPULATION AND WHAT
THEY MEAN FOR OUR FUTURE 66 (1996).
21 Id. at 147.
22 HOLLY SKLAR, CHAOS OR COMMUNITY: SEEKING SOLUTIONS, NOT
SCAPEGOATS FOR BAD ECONOMICS 15 (1995).
23 Keith Bradsher, Low Ranking for Poor American Children, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1995, at A9 (reporting results of 1995 Luxembourg Income Study).
24 id.
25 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 148.
26 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 148 (citing 1992 Luxembourg
Income Study). Bronfenbrenner and his co-authors note that since 1992, child
poverty rates in the United States have been rising: "For this and other reasons
... the rank order of the United States in this international comparison (and
others to follow) is not likely to have changed appreciably in the past 10 years."
BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 281, n.4.
27 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 148.
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$6.7 trillion dollars is by far the richest nation in the world.2" Per
capita income in the United States is also among the highest in the
world, significantly higher than some of the nations that have child
poverty rates only a fraction of that of the United States.29
To speak of children in poverty, in this context, means that
those children reside in households (of any size) that have income
or cash assistance less than an amount equal to what is known as
the federal poverty line.30 Table 1, below, shows the poverty line
and "deep poverty line"'" in 1995, for households of various sizes.
28 Luxembourg First in Per Capita Income: US. Ranked Sixth, World Bank
Atlas Says, BNA Management Briefing, Jan. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, bna
Library, bnamb File. The United States, with a per capita Gross National Product
("GNP") of $25,860.00, is ranked sixth in per capita GNP in the world. The five
nations with larger per capita GNP are: (1) Luxembourg-$39,850.00; (2)
Switzerland-$37,180.00;(3)Japan-$34,630.00;(4) Denmark-$28,110.00;and
(5) Norway-26,480.00. Id. By purchasing power, however, the United States
ranked second in the world, behind only Luxembourg. Id.
29 See Steven Greenhouse, New Tally of World's Economies Catapults China
Into Third Place, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1993, at Al. The 1993 figures are
suitable for comparing child poverty rates and per capita income. France and
Italy, for example, with child poverty rates in 1993 (and now) significantly lower
than the United States, had much smaller per capita incomes (as well as Gross
National Products) than the United States. Id. In 1993, the U.S. per capita
income (measured in terms of purchasing power) was $22,204.00. Id. In France
the figure was $18,227.00 (18% lower than the United States), and in Italy the
figure was $16,896.00 (24% lower than the United States). Id. Nevertheless, both
nations, then and now, had rates of child poverty well below that of the United
States. For an excellent analysis of why France, with more limited economic
resources, has far lower rates of child poverty, see Hopfensperger, supra note 18,
at 1A.
30 JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 33 (1995). The
terms "poverty line" and "poverty rate" are used throughout this Article. The
"poverty line" is explained in the text. The "poverty rate" is the percentage of
the U.S. population that lives in households, of any size, with income below the
poverty line. Accordingly, altering the poverty line will almost always alter the
poverty rate.
"' See infra Part II (discussing the "deep poverty line").
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Table 1.
Family Size
Federal
(1995):32
Poverty Line and Deep Poverty Line By
The definition of poverty used to compute the federal poverty
line was developed by the Social Security Administration in 1964,
with revisions by interagency committees in 1969 and 1981. As
explained by the Bureau of the Census:
The original poverty index provided a range of income
cutoffs adjusted by such factors as family size, sex of the
family head, and the number of children under 18 years
old .... At the core of this definition of poverty was the
economy food plan, the least costly of four nutritionally
adequate food plans developed by the Department of
Agriculture. It was determined from [the department's]
survey of food consumption that families of three or more
persons spent approximately one-third of their income on
food; the poverty level was therefore set at three times the
cost of the economy food plan. For smaller families and
32 Suzanne Gamboa, Federal Poverty Yardstick Is Flawed. Statistician Says
She Never Intended Her Formula to Be Used to Define Who is Poor, AUSTIN
AM. STATESMAN, Nov. 26, 1995, at All (citing 60 Fed. Reg. 27 (1995)).
" BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 147 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1960-1992)).
Size of Poverty Deep
Household Line 1995 Poverty
Line 1995
1 $7,470 $3,735
2 $10,030 $5,015
3 $12,590 $6,295
4 $15,150 $7,755
5 $17,710 $8,855
6 $20,270 $10,135
7 $22,830 $11,415
8 $25,390 $12,695
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persons living alone, the cost of the economy food plan
was multiplied by factors that were slightly higher in order
to compensate for the relatively larger fixed expenses of
these smaller households.
3 4
Simply (but still more or less accurately) put, the poverty line is an
inflation adjusted estimate of the least costly food budget for a
family times three.35
Some conservatives have argued that the poverty line exagger-
ates the perception of poverty in the United States by not including
the cash value of various in-kind benefits, including food stamps
and, most significantly, Medicaid.36 Progressives, conversely,
argue that the poverty line understates the problem of poverty by
setting the threshold of impoverishment far too lOW.
37
There are three strong arguments for why the poverty line does,
in fact, underestimate what is required for a family to rise out of
poverty. First, the federal poverty line, itself based on a minimally
adequate diet, underestimates the percentage of family income
devoted to housing, transportation, and costs incurred by parents
working outside the home, most significantly, child care.38
Statistics on child care expenditures for employed mothers paying
for child care (with the youngest child younger than five) at least
partially confirm that point. Families with working mothers, and
family income beneath the poverty line, paid 23% of family income
34 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 147. For a brief, informative
discussion of the way in which the poverty line was first calculated, see
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY 69-70 (1984).
Harrington draws attention to the political interests that were involved in setting
the federal poverty line at a level that would understate the actual levels of
poverty in the United States. It is worth noting that the person who first drew up
the poverty line, Mollie Orshansky, gave an interview in 1995 in which she
claimed that the purpose of the line was to assess poverty among the elderly, and
that she never intended it to be used to measure the poverty rate in the general
population. Gamboa, supra note 32, at A11.
3" HANDLER, supra note 30, at 33-34.
36 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 34.
37 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 34.
38 ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 13.
CHILD POVERTY
in child care expenditures.39 By contrast, families with working
mothers, and family income above the poverty line, paid 9% of
family income in child care expenditures.4 ° Indeed, with one slight
fluctuation for families with income between $35,000.00 and
$49,999.00, the percentage of family income spent on child care
decreases as family income bracket increases.4' Table 2 illustrates
that point.
Table 2. Mean
Mothers Paying for
:.^ / tt3 42
1' LVe
Weekly Child Care Expenditures, Employed
Child Care, Youngest Child Younger Than Age
Family Weekly Percentage
Income Expenditure of
(dollars) Income
Below 37.27 23
Poverty Line
Above 65.45 9
Poverty Line
$15,000- 50.72 13
$24,999
$25,000- 50.71 9
$34,999
$35,000- 64.53 10
$49,999
$50,000 85.11 6
or More
" Barbara R. Bergmann, Child Care: The Key to Ending Child Poverty, in
SOCIAL POLICIES FOR CHILDREN 112, 116 tbl.4-1 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds.,
1996).
40 Id. at 116 tbl.4-1.
41 Id. at 116.
42 Id. (reprinting SANDRA L. HOFFERTH ET AL., NATIONAL CHILD' CARE
SURVEY 164-65 (1991)).
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In the same vein, at a time when the official poverty rate in the
United States was 13%, a 1988 study found that when the poverty
line was adjusted for then current housing costs, the poverty rate in
the United States rose to 23%-10% higher than the unadjusted
poverty rate.43 Adjusting the poverty line for then current food
costs increased the poverty rate even further to 25.8%, almost
double the numbers of those defined as poor." A similar adjust-
ment for noncash benefits resulted in a poverty rate of 11.6%, a
decrease of only 1.4% from the 1988 official poverty rate.45 In
considering the slight downward effect of adjusting the poverty line
to include noncash benefits, it should be noted that:
[M]ore than one out of four officially poor people (in
1992) receive[d] no government assistance of any
kind--cash or noncash. Fewer than one out of five offi-
cially poor people live[d] in public or subsidized housing.
Half live[d] in households that receive[d] no food stamps.
Moreover, according to the Census Bureau, despite the
existence of such programs as Medicaid and Medicare, 29
percent of the officially poor had no public or private
medical insurance of any kind at any time during 1993.46
Secondly, the poverty line treats poverty as simply a matter of
income. It ignores the relative nature of poverty, that is, the way in
which the experience of poverty changes as a society grows more
prosperous. Christopher Jencks explains the concept as follows:
[P]eople need more goods and services when their society
gets richer. Needs increase not just because people think
they need more when their neighbors have more, but also
for practical reasons.47
43 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 14 tbl.5 ("Adjusting the Poverty Rate for
Food/Housing Costs and NonCash Benefits, 1988.").
44 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 14 tbl.5.
41 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 14 tbl.5.
46 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 13, 14 tbl.5 (citing UNITED STATES BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992 xvii-xviii, tbls.F, G (1993);
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL BRIEF: HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE 1993 (1994)).
41 CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY,
AND THE UNDERCLASS 7 (1992).
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Jencks uses the examples of the automobile and the telephone as
two devices that, considered luxuries in 1900, have effectively
become necessities today, not because a vast number of people in
the United States have cars and telephones, but because our society
has become so structured that not having those items affects the
ability to find and keep a job, go to and from work, shop and
obtain access to medical care.4"
Jencks' point can be expanded to include items beyond those
that have become "necessities." If instead of focusing on what is
needed to maintain some bare level of physical existence, such as
food and shelter, one looks to items that allow a family to
participate, in some meaningful way, in the society in which the
family exists,4 9 the inadequacy of the federal poverty level
becomes even more apparent.
Thirdly, as unscientific but nevertheless probative evidence of
the fact that the federal poverty line understates the problem of
poverty in the United States, many Americans believe that
significantly more than what is determined by the federal poverty
line is needed to lift a family out of poverty5 ° When asked by the
Gallop organization, "What amount of weekly income would you
use as a poverty line for a family of four (husband, wife and two
children) in this community?" the average response was $303.00
per week or $15,700.00 per year.5' Those polled who lived in
cities of one million or more people gave an even higher yearly
figure of $17,600.00.52 At the time the poll was taken in 1989, the
federal poverty line for a family of four was $12,675.00.13 In
other words, those polled believed, on average, that a poor family
48 id.
49 HARRINGTON, supra note 34, at 74. Peter Townsend, in his Poverty in the
United Kingdom, defined poverty as "the lack of resources necessary to permit
participation in the activities, customs, and diets commonly approved by society."
HARRINGTON, supra note 34, at 74 (citing PETER TOWNSEND, POVERTY IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM: A SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLD RESOURCES AND STANDARDS OF
LIVING 31 (1979)).
50 JENCKS, supra note 47, at 209.
s JENCKS, supra note 47, at 209.
52 JENCKS, supra note 47, at 209.
53 JENCKS, supra note 47, at 209.
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would need an amount 24% higher than the federal poverty line to
leave the ranks of the impoverished. 4
The debate over the poverty line is particularly germane to the
discussion of children in poverty since so many children live in
households at or near the poverty line. In 1993, 34% of all children
in the United States lived in households with incomes up to 150%
of the poverty line, and 39.8% lived in households with incomes up
to 175% of the poverty line.1
Table 3. Dollar Amounts for the Official Poverty Line In 1993,
150% of that Line and 175% of that Line:5 6
Household 1993 150% of 175% of
Composition Poverty 1993 1993
Line Poverty Poverty
Line Line
1 Person $7,518 $11,277 $13,156
< 65
2 People, with
1 Child $9,960 $14,940 $17,430
<18
3 People, with
1 Child $11,631 $17,446 $20,354
<18
4 People, with
2 Children $14,654 $21,981 $25,644
<18 _
54 JENCKS, supra note 47, at 209. But see ROBERT RECTOR & WILLIAM F.
LAUBER, AMERICA'S FAILED $5.4 TRILLION WAR ON POVERTY 24 (1995) (article
reprinted as a book) (arguing, without any polling data, that "[t]o the man on the
street, to say someone is poor implies that he is malnourished, poorly clothed,
and living in filthy, dilapidated, and overcrowded housing. In reality there is
little material poverty in the U.S. in the sense generally understood by the
public.").
55 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 12 tbl.4.
56 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 12 tbl.4.
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Even a relatively small upward adjustment in the poverty line
would increase significantly the number of children officially
considered poor. It should be noted that, according to the results of
the Gallop poll discussed above, most Americans implicitly favor
such an adjustment, since they believe that the poverty line should
be set at about 125% of its current level.
In that intuition, if not in the specific adjustment they would
make, the American people are joined by experts at the National
Academy of Sciences who have studied the way in which poverty
is defined in the United States. 7 The "Panel on Poverty and
Family Assistance" has recommended to Congress that the poverty
line be redefined so as to include noncash benefits, but also take
into consideration taxes, work expenses, child care costs, and out
of pocket medical expenses. 8 The net result of adopting the
panel's recommendations would be an increase in the number of
people officially determined to be poor in the United States.59 For
example, following the panel's recommendations, the 1992 overall
poverty rate of 14.5% would have increased to somewhere between
15% and 16% and, depending on whether all of the panel's
recommendations are accepted, could have exceeded 18%.6o In
short, the United States not only has the highest rates of child
poverty of any industrialized democracy, but the official compu-
tation of those rates probably understates the number of children
who are poor. The aggregate numbers of poor children, however,
does not tell the full story of child poverty in the United States. It
is to a closer analysis of those aggregate figures that this discussion
now turns.
II. TRENDS IN CHILD POVERTY
Looking more closely at the number of children in poverty,
several disturbing trends become apparent. First, the rate of child
"' Robert Pear, A Proposed Definition of Poverty May Raise Number of US.
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, §1, at 1.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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poverty is increasing.6' The percentage of people living in poverty
in the Unites States, after a steady and almost precipitous drop
from 1960 to 1973, has exhibited, with fluctuations, a general
upward trend since 1974, and a steady increase in poverty rates
since 1988.62 Both the levels of poverty and rates of increase in
the levels of poverty have been even more pronounced for children.
The child poverty rate has gone from about 15% in 1974; to about
22% in 1993; to between 24% and 29% today.63 Moreover,
poverty among working families with children increased by nearly
48%.64 From 1977 to 1993, the poverty rate for such families
climbed from 7.7% to 11.4%.65 This is particularly significant
since more than one third of poor children live in working families,
an increase of 30% from 1989 to 1994.66 For all children in the
population, those with both employed and unemployed parents, the
most recent data indicate a child poverty rate almost twice that of
the general population.67 In short, what the historian of childhood
Hugh Cunningham said of sixteenth century Europe is true of the
United States in the 1990s: "[T]he evidence is that for a large part
of the life cycle, children contributed to, rather than relieved, the
problem of poverty ... Children constituted a large percentage of
the poor.,
68
61 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN: POVERTY
AND DIVERSITY CHALLENGE SCHOOLS NATIONWIDE 4 (Apr. 4, 1994) (reporting
that "national poverty rate for school-age children ... increased from 15.3
percent in 1980 to 17.1 percent in 1990. The poverty rate for all children has
continued to increase since 1990.") [hereinafter SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN].
62 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 66 fig.3-8.
63 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 66; see also Hopfensperger,
supra note 18, at IA (citing the same statistics of children who are poor based
on wage income).
64 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 66.
65 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 66.
66 John Rivera, Study Sheds Light on Poverty; A Third of Poor Children
Have Parent Who Works, Survey of States Finds, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, June
3, 1996, at A2 (reporting on Casie Foundation study of youth poverty).
67 Id
68 HUGH CUNNINGHAM, CHILDREN & CHILDHOOD IN WESTERN SOCIETY
SINCE 1500, at 111 (1995).
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Apart from the sheer numbers of children in poverty, the
intensity of child poverty is particularly acute and seems to be
worsening. This is a second trend apparent in the U.S. census data:
children tend not only to be poor in disproportionate numbers, but
tend disproportionately to be among the poorest of the poor.69
Over the past two decades, the number of children living in so-
called deep poverty (defined by the Census Bureau as household
income equal to or less than half the official poverty line) "has
more than doubled, from 1.1 million in 1975 to 2.8 million in
1994. ' ' 70 Nearly half of all young children live in deep poverty. 7'
Moreover, a growing percentage of the homeless, arguably the
poorest of the poor, are families with children. In 1985, families
with children accounted for 27% of the homeless. By 1991, such
families accounted for 34%.72 By 1994, families with children
accounted for 39% of the homeless population.73
Thirdly, the younger a child is, the more likely the child is to
be poor. Prior to the mid-1970s, older people in the United States
experienced comparatively higher levels of poverty. Since that time,
however, the poverty rates of children and young adults and the
poverty rates of older people converged, and then diverged, but
with the positions reversed: children and young adults now
experience significantly higher rates of poverty than older peo-
ple.74
By age bracket, current poverty rates can be graphed, with one
minor deviation, on an inverted (and asymmetrical) bell curve. The
highest rates of poverty (26%) are experienced by the youngest
children (newborns to five), decline to 20% for children age six to
seventeen, drop to 18% for young adults (eighteen to twenty-four),
drop to 13% for adults aged twenty-five to thirty-four, and reach
their nadir among that part of the population aged forty-five to
fifty-four. For those persons aged fifty-five and older, poverty rates
69 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 181-82.
70 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 181.
7' BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 181.
72 NANCY FOLBRE, CENTER FOR POPULAR EcoNoMIcs, THE NEW FIELD
GUIDE TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 6.12 (1995).
7' ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 38.
7' BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 155 tbl.5-5.
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begin to climb (though not as steeply as they descended from the
youngest age groups), growing from 8% for people aged forty-five
to fifty-four; 10% (fifty-five to fifty-nine); 11% (sixty to sixty-
four); 10% (sixty-five to seventy-four); and 14% (over seventy-
five)."
Relatively higher levels of poverty for the youngest children are
not a recent phenomenon. At least since 1959, children under six
years of age have experienced rates of poverty greater than children
from six to seventeen years of age.76 That trend, however, has
grown more pronounced since 1981. According to 1993 data about
a six point difference exists in the poverty rates between children
under age six (approximately 26% in poverty), and those between
ages six and seventeen (approximately 20% live in poverty).77
Younger children also tend to be more negatively affected by short-
term economic changes, largely because their families are generally
younger and are more likely to be impoverished during periods of
recession.7"
The fourth trend discemable in the data on child poverty is that
child poverty is significantly correlated, in scope, intensity, and
duration to the race of the child. Specifically, Black and Latino7 9
children experience rates of poverty much greater than the total
child population. "In 1993, 46% of all African-American children
and 41% of all Latino children lived in families with incomes
below the poverty level."8 It is true that the difference between
the poverty rate of Black children and the poverty rate of White
7 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 155 tbl.5-5.
76 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 151 tbl.5-3.
7 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 151 tbl.5-3.
78 See BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 151-52 (discussing the
correlation between income inequality and child poverty, and how this has
negatively affected young families and their children). See also infra Part
IV.B.1.C (discussing the way in which poverty rates among young parents
disproportionately affect young children).
" This Article's focus on Black and Latino children, in discussing racial
disparities in child poverty, is purely a function of available data and space
limitations. Child poverty is also a significant problem for Asian American
children and Native American children, among others.
8 ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 27 (citing THE STATE OF AMERICA'S
CHILDREN YEARBOOK 1995 101 (1995)).
CHILD POVERTY
children has, for the most part, decreased since 1960.1 In that
year, White children experienced a poverty rate of 20%, compared
to 65.5% for Black children (a 45.5 point difference)., 2 Ten years
later, the child poverty rates for White children stood at 10.5%, and
for Black children 41.5% (a 31% difference). 3 It is no accident
that a dramatic decrease in relative and absolute child poverty rates,
like a similar decrease in poverty rates for the elderly and the
general population, happened to coincide with the most intensive
period of spending on poor relief in the past three decades, that is
the "Great Society" and "War on Poverty" programs instituted by
Lyndon Johnson and, for the most part, continued through the first
Nixon administration.
By 1980, absolute rates of child poverty had begun to climb,
but the difference in rates of poverty between White and Black
children had narrowed, albeit very slightly, once again. White
children experienced a poverty rate of 13.4%, compared to 42.1%
for Black children (a 28.7% difference).8 4 By 1990, the poverty
rates of both groups had climbed further, but now the gap between
the two groups widened once again. White children had a poverty
rate of 13.7% in 1990, compared to a rate of 45.9% for Black
children (a 32.2% difference).8 5
The most recent data reveal a continued and marked disparity
in poverty rates between White and Black children, but the
difference in poverty rates between the two groups has dropped
slightly. According to 1994 government data, 16.9% of White
children lived in poverty compared to 46.6% of Black children (a
29.7% difference).8 6
81 Irwin Garfinkel et al., Introduction to Child Care: The Key to Ending
Child Poverty, in SOCIAL POLICIES FOR CHILDREN, supra note 39, at 1, 8-9 tbl. 1-
1.
82 Id. at 8 tbl.l.
83 Id
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See Carl T. Rowan, 'Reformers 'Buy Into Welfare Myths, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
June 17, 1994, at 41 (discussing the large number of poor people in the United
States who lack the training and opportunity to find work).
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Race differences are also evident in rates of deep poverty.
Approximately 8.2% of all children under age six live in deep
poverty. 87 For young White children the percentage in deep
poverty is 7.7%.8 For Black children, however, the percentage in
deep poverty is nearly 33%.89
In summary, child poverty is growing greater in both magnitude
and intensity, and those trends are most pronounced for young
children of color.
III. THE EFFECTS OF CHILD POVERTY
Focusing upon how many children are poor, and the characteris-
tics of those children, can obscure the empirical effects of poverty,
the measurable and highly deleterious impact that poverty has on
the physical, emotional, and intellectual growth of human beings.
Accordingly, some inventory of those terrible effects is in order.
If space and the conventions of law review literature allowed it,
the best person to turn to for such an inventory would be Jonathan
Kozol. Kozol has spent much of the past three decades learning and
writing about the lives of poor children and their families.9"
Kozol's method is based on total immersion: he goes to live with
his subjects, sharing their lives as completely as he can. His writing
style is narrative and not without its critics. Kozol attempts to let
the people, the mostly poor children and their families about whom
he writes, speak for themselves.
Unfortunately, Kozol's style of reportage does not lend itself to
summarization. The whole point of his work is to recreate for the
reader the experience of listening to a poor child speak about the
details; the innumerable, frequently surprising, sometimes heart-
breaking details of what it means to be young and poor in the
United States. The limits of this essay regrettably prevent that.
7 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 181.
88 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 181.
9 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 181.
90 Kozol's books include: AMAZING GRACE: THE LIVES OF CHILDREN AND
THE CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1995); DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE (1967);
RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA (1988); and
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991).
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Instead, a bare recitation of some salient facts about the lives of
poor children is offered. Behind those facts, however, are real
human beings, children.
Data on the harmful effects of impoverishment on children can
usefully be surveyed in three categories: (1) physical and psycho-
logical health; (2) intellectual development and education; and (3)
crime victimization and crime commission. With regard to the first
category, the straightforward conclusion is that poverty has a close
correlation to death and disease in childhood. As one commentator
on child poverty has put it: "In America, being poor is deadly."'"
The harmful effects of economic deprivation on the physical
health of children are both severe and well documented:
* Every day, twenty-seven children die from the effects of
poverty.9
2
" Poor children are more than twice as likely as other children
to suffer from severe physical or mental disabilities, fatal
accidental injuries, iron deficiency, and severe asthma.93
, Between 33% and 50% of poor children consume signifi-
cantly less than the federally recommended level of calories
and nutrients.
94
9' James Garbarino, The Meaning of Poverty in the World of Children,
reprinted in CHILDREN IN CRisis 119, 127 (Robin Brown ed., 1994).
92 Kerri Ann Law, Note, Hope for the Future, Overcoming Jurisdictional
Concerns to Achieve U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of
Children, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1851, 1861 (1994).
9' ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 27.
94 ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 35. But see RECTOR & LAUBER, supra
note 54, at 24. Rector argues that:
Children living in 'poverty' today, far from being malnourished,
actually grow up to be one inch taller and ten pounds heavier than the
average child of the same age in the general population in the late
1950s. The principle nutrition-related problem facing poor persons in
the U.S. today is obesity, not 'hunger'; the poor have a higher rate of
obesity than do members of other socioeconomic groups in the U.S.
RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 54, at 24.
Rector is apparently unaware that obesity and malnutrition can, and frequently
do, co-exist.
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" Poor children are more likely to have stunted growth because
of malnutrition.95
* In Chicago, the poorest third of the city's neighborhoods had
infant mortality rates five times that of the most affluent
third.96
" The infant mortality rate for Blacks, who are disproportion-
ately represented among both the poor and Aid to Families
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") recipients, is double that
for Whites.97
" The life expectancy of Black children in the United States is
seven years shorter than that of White children. If ranked on
a global scale, the infant mortality rate of Blacks would
place thirty-fifth in the world, equal to infant mortality rates
in China and Bulgaria and worse than the infant mortality
rates of Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Poland, Cuba, and Kuwait.98
" Poor children are far more likely to lack health insurance.
Even when insured through Medicaid, poor children are far
less likely to receive adequate preventative care including
regular physical and dental examinations. 99
• Children who lack health insurance are less likely to be
immunized against preventable childhood diseases; are less
likely to see a doctor regularly; and are far more likely to
have treatment of health problems delayed. Because of
delays in treatment, uninsured children are at greater risk of
being hospitalized for complications due to untreated
conditions. 0
" The United States has the highest infant mortality rate in the
developed world. Compared with Canadian children, U.S.
9 ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 34.
96 Garbarino, supra note 91, at 127.
Philip Seib, Political Meddling Can Endanger Dallas County Health Care,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 24, 1995, at 27A.
98 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 15.
99 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CHIL-
DREN-STATE AND PRIVATE PROGRAMS CREATE NEW STRATEGIES TO INSURE
CHILDREN, Feb. 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 136863.
100 Michael D. Kogan et al., The Effect of Gaps in Health Insurance on
Continuity of a Regular Source of Care Among Preschool-Aged Children in the
United States, 274 JAMA 1429, 1429 (1995).
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children under fifteen years of age had 28% more disability
days and 44% more days when they were sick in bed.
Children under one year of age had a 14% higher mortality
rate, and children one to four years of age had a mortality
rate 8% higher than Canadian children.'
The harmful health consequences of poverty also have a
profound psychological and emotional impact.
* Poor children suffer from significantly higher levels of
depression, anti-social behavior, and impulsivity. They are
far less likely to be hopeful, self-directed, and confident
about the future.
10 2
" Poor children, by age five, also demonstrate significantly
higher levels of fearfulness, anxiety, and unhappiness than
children who were never poor.'0 3
" Poor children exhibit higher levels, than non-poor children,
of behavior problems like tantrum throwing and property
destruction.'04
Living in poverty also correlates strongly with poor academic
performance.
" By age five, children in persistently or occasionally poor
families have markedly lower intelligence quotients ("IQs")
than children in never-poor families. °5
" Poor children are far more at risk, than non-poor children, of
poor school performance and academic failure. 10
6
lane Currie & Thomas Duncan, Medical Care for Children: Public
Insurance, Private Insurance, and Racial Differences in Utilization, 30 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 135, 135 (1995) (citations omitted).
..2 Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and
the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 563 (1995).
103 Bruce Bower, Growing up Poor; Poverty Packs Several Punches for
Child Development, SCI. NEWS, Jul. 9, 1994, at 24 (reporting on the results of
a study conducted by University of Michigan Social Scientist Greg J. Duncan
and his colleagues).
104 id.
105 Id
106 See SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN, supra note 61, at 2 (reporting that poor
children are more likely to experience academic failure that will continue
throughout their entire lives).
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• Poor children are more likely than non-poor children to
change schools frequently. Children who change schools
frequently are more likely to have lower academic per-
formance. For example, "41 percent of the children who
changed schools frequently read below their grade level
compared with 26 percent of those who have never changed
schools."'0 7 Furthermore, children who change schools
frequently are more likely to experience behavioral prob-
lems.108
• Poverty is the strongest predictor that a child will drop out
of school before obtaining a high school diploma.'0 9
" Poor children who also have limited proficiency in English
are not only more likely to drop out of school because of
academic failure, but once dropping out are more likely than
high school graduates to be arrested and to become unmar-
ried parents." 0
• Schools with a high rate of child poverty have a much
greater number of children who are low achievers. As a
result, these schools are more likely to retain children at a
particular grade level than schools with lower numbers of
poor children. In addition, these schools have a higher rate
of absenteeism.'
Children in poverty are also more likely to be both the victims
of crime and to be incarcerated for criminal activity.
* The vast majority of children under the supervision of the
juvenile justice system come from poor families. Poverty is
strongly correlated to both juvenile delinquency and the
likelihood of arrest or incarceration as an adult." 2
107 SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN, supra note 61, at 12.
"' SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN, supra note 61, at 12.
109 Nancy E. David, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
19, 26 (1995).
110 SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN, supra note 61, at 2.
"' SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN, supra note 61, at 12.
12 Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to
Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 517 (1995).
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* Poverty can also be strongly linked to child maltreatment on
both the individual and community level."3
" Poor children, like poor adults, are much more likely to be
victims of crime. For people over twelve years of age, those
in families with annual incomes under $7500.00 experience
a crime victimization rate of 89.5 per 1000. By contrast,
those with annual incomes over $75,000.00 experience a
crime victimization rate of 38.2 per 1000."'
Finally, children from poor families are three times as likely as
their middle-class peers to be poor as adults. The likelihood of a
poor child ending up in poverty as an adult is even greater for
Blacks."5 Gender, too, affects the likelihood that a poor child
will be a poor adult. Controlling for race, daughters of poor
families are more likely than sons of poor families to grow up to
be poor adults. 116 In what is perhaps the saddest commentary on
child poverty in the United States, even if a child survives growing
up amid the health hazards, higher crime rates and poor schools
that plague America's impoverished communities, the statistical
likelihood is that a poor child will simply become a poor adult.
IV THE CAUSES OF CHILD POVERTY
The causes of child poverty, like the causes of poverty
generally, are the subject of considerable and sometimes acrimoni-
ous debate. What is not often acknowledged, however, is that there
is widespread agreement across the ideological spectrum about what
causes children to be poor. Two factors combine to create child
poverty: (1) children cannot support themselves economically; and
(2) those upon whom children rely for care-parents, guardians,
public or private institutions-are unable or unwilling to discharge
that responsibility.
About the first factor, there is no serious dispute. It is in the
second factor, however, that the bone of contention is buried. The
central question of the debate around child poverty, a question that
... Garbarino, supra note 91, at 127.
114 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 22 fig.1-17.
"' BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 178.
116 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 178.
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implicates the larger debate about poverty in the United States, is
why the caretakers of children, primarily parents, are unable or
unwilling to provide adequately for the children in their care. While
both conservatives and progressives direct attention toward both
parents and government, the conservative position tends to explain
the problem of poverty in terms of parental failure encouraged by
misguided government policies.
The conservative position holds that teenage pregnancy, non-
marital births,117 drug abuse, and the absence of a work ethic
among parents of poor children offer an explanation for why the
caretakers of children cannot provide for those children adequately.
Government intervention is regarded as, at best, unhelpful and, at
worst, counterproductive. Indeed, as will be seen later,"8 a
central tenet of the conservative position is that government
attempts to relieve poverty, and child poverty particularly, have
only exacerbated the problem. 9
Progressives, in contrast, understand the problem of child
poverty to be the result of larger economic forces that prevent
significant numbers of poor parents from earning enough to support
their children, and an inadequate system of government assistance
to help offset the impoverishing effects of those economic forces.
That is not to say that economic conditions do not often have
cultural effects. All but the most dogmatic economic reductionists
have long recognized that poverty is more than a matter of
deprivation of material goods: it is a set of material conditions that
have profound physical and psychological consequences, including
all sorts of maladaptive responses.
.17 Following the practice of the Census Department, this Article uses the
term "nonmarital births" (or some variant thereof) as a nonpejorative synonym
for "illegitimate births" (and variations thereon). When a cited authority uses the
term "illegitimacy" (or some variation), the original term is retained.
118 See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing conservative criticism of government
attempts to relieve poverty).
.. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERiCAN SOCIAL
POLICY, 1950-1980 (10th anniversary ed. 1994) (arguing that poor relief
programs encourage social pathology among the poor). Losing Ground is, in
many ways, the charter of the modem movement to abolish poor relief programs.
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Poverty provides fertile ground for the growth of vice, and
barren soil for the cultivation of virtue. Anger, alienation, violence,
drug abuse, and despair are often responses to and flourish within
the material conditions of deprivation known as poverty. 20
Poverty, or more accurately, the impoverishment of millions of
families, is not, according to the progressive view, the result of the
wickedness of the poor (though it may well be in significant part
a product of the wickedness of the rich). Rather, progressives cite
unemployment, the decline in wages of working families, the
absence of universal health insurance, the unavailability of
affordable child care, and the absence of an adequate system of
state provided assistance to poor and working class families as the
most significant causes of the massive numbers of American
children who live in poverty.'
It is, of course, impossible to provide a thorough discussion of
the conservative and progressive positions in an Article of this
length. Nevertheless, an accurate sketch can be made of the most
important points in each position. For the conservative position
those points are two: (1) destructive behavior by parents, especially
irresponsible sexual behavior and its consequence, nonmarital
120 There is nothing surprising, or novel, or particularly "liberal" about this
position. Plato and Aristotle, for instance, took it for granted that in order to
cultivate virtue in human beings, to live a genuinely good human life, to educate
the young for citizenship, and from that to create and sustain a stable and just
political order, it is indispensable that citizens and their children be provided
with or at least have the means of producing or acquiring the material goods
sufficient not just to maintain existence, but to sustain a level of material comfort
sufficient to undertake the necessary tasks of education (when a child) and
governance (when an adult). See PLATO, supra note 2, at 369a-374e (establishing,
as the first priority in setting up the ideal city, that the inhabitants have a
sufficient level of material well being), 421 d-423b (arguing that both poverty and
excessive wealth weaken the city and, especially at 423a, that inequalities of
income undermine political stability); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1253b (Jowett trans.,
1947) (arguing that a sufficient amount of property is absolutely essential for a
household (the basis of the healthy city) to flourish for "no man can live well,
or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with the necessaries").
121 See, e.g., SKLAR, supra note 22, at 69-102 (discussing the scapegoating
of the poor and locating the causes of impoverishment in the economy).
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births,'22 are the primary reason for the growing number of
children in poverty; and (2) government attempts at alleviating
poverty have accomplished little or nothing and, in many instances,
have created a disincentive to work and encouraged various forms
of cultural pathology that lead parents to be unable or unwilling to
provide for the children in their care. For the progressive position,
two contentions need to be examined: (1) the economy of the
United States maintains unacceptably high levels of unemployment,
and the wages paid by the jobs that are available are, in a large and
growing number of cases, both inadequate to preserve a family
from poverty and decreasing in real purchasing power over time;
and (2) the level of government assistance, of all types, to poor
children and their parents is insufficient to offset the systemic
failures of the U.S. economy. It is to each of these positions that
some attention will now be given.
2 3
122 See Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct.
29, 1993, at A14. While divorce and failure to pay child support are frequently
decried by conservatives, those issues pale in comparison to the focus on
illegitimacy in the conservative position on child poverty. See, e.g., DAVID
BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT
SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995) (arguing that contemporary American society views
fathers as optional and marriage as provisional).
123 It is important to recognize that there are other, arguably more radical,
progressive interpretations of the causes of poverty, and child poverty in
particular. Among those is the theory that a certain level of suffering due to
impoverishment is an integral part of depressing labor costs (by creating a labor
surplus) and maintaining labor "discipline" by keeping the harsh consequences
of refusing to work-strikes being the prime example of such refusal-ever
before the eyes of the working class. That, of course, was a critical aspect of
Marx's theory of "The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation," in Volume I,
Chapter 25 of Capital. MARX, supra note 1, at 762-870 (especially Parts three
and four, "The Progressive Production of a Relative Surplus Population or
Industrial Reserve Army" and "Different Forms of Existence of the Relative
Surplus Population," at 781-802). Poor children, what Marx termed "orphans and
pauper children," were one of the three categories of the lumpenproletariat, "the
lowest sediment of the relative surplus population." MARX, supra note 1, at 797.
Such theories, both functionalist and structuralist, are touched upon in the intro-
duction to Part IV.B, infra.
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A. Parental Faults and Government Failures
1. Parental Faults
Marvin Olasky, one of the most influential proponents of the
conservative position on poor relief, begins his book The Tragedy
of American Compassion by quoting approvingly some words of
the puritan cleric Cotton Mather to his congregation: "Instead of
exhorting you to augment your charity, I will rather utter an
exhortation... that you may not abuse your charity by misapply-
ing it. ' Olasky praises Mather's "restraint" in not assuming that
"all men (and women) naturally want to work."' 25 Mather's
admonition launches Olasky's argument for the thesis that there are
deserving and undeserving poor people and that indiscriminate
charity-assistance without conditions and incentives backed by the
threat of destitution-has a corrupting influence on its recipients.
Olasky identifies the federal government, primarily through the
AFDC program, 116 as the most egregious dispenser of such
"misapplied" charity.'27
124 MARVIN OLASKY, TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION 9 (1994).
125 Id. (emphasis in original).
126 See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC") payments). With the enactmentof House Bill 3734 in August
1996, the AFDC program was officially brought to an end. H.R. 3734, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (enacted). Substantively, the end of AFDC meant, inter
alia, an abolition of the federal entitlement of assistance to poor children and
their families; the restructuring of federal poor relief assistance as block grants
to the states; the imposition of time limits on recipients of poor relief; the
exclusion of legal immigrants from most provisions of poor relief and the food
stamp program; and the granting of almost unfettered discretion to the states in
the administration of the program. Terminologically, AFDC was changed to
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families or TANF.' It will take months, some
predict years, for House Bill 3734 to be fully implemented. At the time of the
publication of this Article, and most likely for some time to come, AFDC is still
universally used to refer to those programs administered under Title I of the
Social Security Act of 1935. Accordingly, the AFDC terminology has been
retained throughout this Article.
127 OLASKY, supra note 124, at 9.
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Olasky's thesis is an echo of what Charles Murray wrote nearly
a decade earlier in Losing Ground:
The most compelling explanation for the marked shift in
the fortunes of the poor is that they continued to respond,
as they always had, to the world as they found it, but that
we-meaning the not-poor and un-disadvantaged-had
changed the rules of their world. Not of our world, just of
theirs. The first effect of the new rules was to make it
profitable for the poor to behave in the short term in ways
that were destructive in the long term. Their second effect
was to mask these long-term losses-to subsidize irretriev-
able mistakes. We tried to provide more for the poor and
produced more poor instead. We tried to remove the
barriers to escape from poverty, and inadvertently built a
trap. 128
The most obvious destructive behaviors to which Murray refers
are an unwillingness to work, and a tendency to indolence
exacerbated by the government's willingness to ameliorate the
harsh discipline of poverty.129 Crime and educational failure are
also examples of secondary or tertiary effects of the perverse
incentives conservatives believe the federal system of poor relief
has created. 3 ' But the purportedly destructive behavior that has
drawn the most attention, provoked the most extreme cries of
128 MURRAY, supra note 119, at 9.
129 MURRAY, supra note 119, at 154-64. Murray offers three thought
experiments, involving a fictional couple (Harold and Phyllis), on the disincen-
tives to work (and marry) created by AFDC. Id. See infra Part IV.A.2-B
(analyzing further the argument that the poor on public assistance are unwilling
to work, and that government support promotes that unwillingness).
130 MURRAY, supra note 119, at 167-77. Murray does not assert that what he
interprets to be the dramatic rise in crime, especially among juveniles, is caused
solely by federal poor relief. Rather, Murray believes societal permissiveness, an
unwillingness to apprehend offenders and mete out sufficiently severe punish-
ment, contributes to a dramatic increase in juvenile crime. The sealing ofjuvenile
records and the insulation from public exposure and shame that anonymity
provides is, according to Murray, one of the ways in which society has provided
an incentive to young people to commit crime. MURRAY, supra note 119, at 171.
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alarm,' 31 convinced many putative liberals, 32 and been most
directly connected to public assistance is nonmarital births. 133 As
Charles Murray put it in an influential 1993 piece for the Wall
Street Journal:
My proposition is that illegitimacy is the single most
important social problem of our time-more important than
crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, welfare or homelessness
because it drives everything else. 34
The argument that federal poor relief programs have created, or
at least worsened,'3 the crisis in nonmarital births has three parts.
131 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 122, at A14. Murray begins his analysis of
the problem of illegitimacy among Whites with the words: "Every once in a
while the sky really is falling, and this seems to be the case with the latest
national statistics on illegitimacy." Murray, supra note 122, at A14. See Michael
Novak, Uncle Sam's Children: Without Welfare Reform, Illegitimacy Will Extend
its Ills, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 11, 1994, at 92A. Novak writes that:
The problem is that AFDC is doing such devastating harm to the
nation that unless it is halted-unless, in President Clinton's words, we
achieve EWAWKI, the 'end of welfare as we know it'-the twin
contagions of illegitimacy and more or less permanent welfare
dependency are likely to spread throughout more than half the
childbearing population.
Id. Novak goes on to quote approvingly Daniel Patrick Moynihan's conclusion
that out-of-wedlock births have the potential of "destroying the democratic
dream." Id.
132 MICHAEL LIND, UP FROM CONSERVATISM: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG
FOR AMERICA 168 (1996). Lind not only demolishes the myth of an epidemic of
illegitimacy, but provides an interesting account of why and how the issue came
to be used as a weapon in the conservative rhetorical arsenal. Id. at 168-78.
133 MURRAY, supra note 119, at 125-28. See also Nina J. Easton, Merchants
of Virtue: By Shifting Their Party's Longtime Focus From Money to Values a
Trio of Thinkers Hopes to Win Over the Agenda-and the Soul-of the GOP,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, (Magazine), at 16 ("Murray's followers have shifted
the debate further to the right, saying work [for welfare recipients] isn't the
answer, marriage is. Cost isn't the issue, illegitimacy is.").
134 Murray, supra note 122, at A14.
135 As with juvenile crime, Murray now insists that he is not arguing that
public poor relief programs alone are the cause of the rise in unmarried births.
Murray grants that cultural forces, particularly those lessening the stigma of
unmarried parenthood (read: motherhood), have played a significant role.
Nevertheless, Murray continues to insist that public poor relief programs
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
First, proponents of the argument contend that census data reveal
a dramatic increase in the percentage of nonmarital births, espe-
cially among Blacks, since the 1960s, when the so-called "War on
Poverty" was launched and availability of AFDC benefits signifi-
cantly expanded.
In fact, for the past three decades the number of nonmarital
births per 1000 unmarried women aged fifteen to forty-four has
increased. In 1991, the year on which Murray based his analysis in
his influential op-ed piece for the Wall Street Journal, "The
Coming White Underclass,"' 13 6 nonmarital births constituted about
30% of all live births, or about 1.2 million children. 137 For
Blacks, the statistics seemed even more alarming: "from 23 percent
in 1960 to 28 percent in 1969, to 45 percent in 1980, to 62 percent
at the beginning of the 1990s.,, 138 About the same time (1991),
the proportion of nonmarital births to live births for Whites stood
at 22%.139 Thus proponents of the argument assert that both in
absolute terms (numbers of children born to unmarried mothers)
and as a proportion of live births, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of children born to unmarried mothers.
Second, those who raise the alarm about the crisis in unmar-
ried births point to the positive correlation between single
parent families and various forms of social pathology,
contribute, in themselves, to cultural changes that make unmarried parenthood
acceptable:
If you got rid of the welfare system, it would entail such a huge
jolt-to the economics, yes, but also to the milieu in which all these
actions take place. So it would drastically reduce the number of kids
born out of wedlock.. . . We're trying to get the government to stop
social engineering among people, to let civil society and the play of
forces within civil society once again be the determining factors in
how families are formed. Civil society will say very powerfully to
children entering adolescence that sexual behavior must be confined
within all sorts of penalties and rewards, and it's going to be the same
kinds of penalties and rewards that mankind has used since Day 1.
Easton, supra note 133, at 16.
136 Murray, supra note 122, at A14.
' Murray, supra note 122, at A14.
138 LIND, supra, note 132, at 167.
139 Murray, supra note 122, at A14.
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including poverty. 4 ' Studies of family composition of poor
families indicate that rates of poverty are higher for children
growing up in single-parent families, and especially high for
children growing up in households headed by an unmarried single-
parent mother.1
4
'
Looking at families with young children in poverty, there seems
to be a strong correlation between poverty rates and family
composition. For families with one child under the age of six, only
9% of families headed by two married parents have children living
in poverty. By contrast, 14% of families with one child under six
and headed by a single divorced father, and 51% of families with
one child under six and headed by a single divorced mother, have
children living in poverty.44 The rates are still higher for never-
married single parents. For families with one child under six that
are headed by a never-married father, the percent of children living
in poverty is 33%; for families with one child under six
140 See MURRAY, supra note 119, at 125-33 (documenting the rise of single-
mother families in America and the poverty that results for such families.
"[P]oor, uneducated, single teenaged mothers are in a bad position to raise
children, however much they may love them."); Easton, supra note 133, at 16
(explaining Charles Murray's reliance on studies showing higher crime, drug
abuse, truancy, and other problems for children raised by single mothers).
' BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 167. In 1985, single parent
families in the European Union also experienced rates of poverty between 1.5 to
two times greater than all households. Michael F. Forster, The Effects of Net
Transfers on Low Incomes Among Non-Elderly Families, 22 OECD ECON. STUD.
181 (1994).
142 It is probable that the difference in poverty rates between families headed
by divorced mothers and families headed by divorced fathers has something to
do with the problem of unpaid child support in this country. Nationwide,
approximately $35 billion in outstanding child support payments still goes
uncollected. Russell L. Weaver, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 815, 852 n.137 (1996).
Nevertheless, while enforcing child support more vigorously would undoubtedly
have some salutary effects, it would hardly be enough to lift most children out
of poverty. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YESHEKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL
CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY 223-24 (1991) (offering evidence to demonstrate
that many absent fathers of AFDC children do contribute child support, but that
their low wages make it unlikely that even 100% collection of child support
awards would have a significant effect on AFDC rolls).
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headed by a never-married mother the percent of children in
poverty is 66%.
143
The percent of poor children in single-mother families has been
growing steadily since 1960. The absolute numbers and rate of
growth, however, has been greater for Black children than for
White children.1 44 At present, more than 80% of poor Black
children live with a single parent, almost all single mothers. Nearly
half of poor White children now reside in single parent homes, the
vast majority of those single parents being mothers. 145
When families have more than one child under six, the percent
of children in poverty is even greater. Sixteen percent of children
in families with more than one child under the age of six and
headed by two married parents have children living in poverty. An
astonishing 77% of families, with more than one child under six
and headed by a single divorced mother, have children living in
poverty. For families with more than one child under six that are
headed by an unmarried father, the percent of children living in
poverty is nearly unchanged at 34%; but for. families with more
than one child under six headed by an unmarried mother the
percent of children in poverty jumps to 88%. In other words,
almost nine out of ten children who live with unmarried single
mothers live in poverty.
146
Third, and last, proponents of the argument that child poverty
can be attributed to the undesirable behavior of parents, in this
case, unmarried parenthood, maintain that public assistance,
particularly the AFDC program, has encouraged unmarried people,
especially adolescents, to engage in sexual activity and to bear
children without being married. Conservatives also contend that the
AFDC program has allowed young fathers to abdicate responsibility
and, where fathers are interested in marriage and parental duties,
the AFDC program has created a disincentive for young mothers to
marry the fathers of their children.4 7
14' BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 166 fig.5-13.
144 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 172 fig.5-16.
14' BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 173.
146 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 166 fig.5-13.
147 MURRAY, supra note 119, at 156-62. Murray presents the first of the
"Harold and Phyllis" thought experiments in which a young, poor, unmarried
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Moreover, conservatives argue that because the AFDC budget
increases with family size, the program has created a cash incentive
for poor people to have more children. That conviction has led to
calls for "child exclusion" provisions that deny additional support
to any children born to a family while on AFDC.' Nearly three
quarters of families on AFDC are headed by single parents
(overwhelmingly women).'49 Forty-five percent of AFDC families
are headed by an adult who has never been married. 5' Thirty
percent of AFDC families are single parents as a result of divorce
or separation. 151
The arguments, outlined above, have had an astonishing degree
of success with the public and even with putative liberals. The
problem is that they are based, as Michael Lind has put it in a
recent book, on "a ludicrous misreading of the relevant data."
' 5 2
If the conservative argument about the connection between public
poor relief programs, in this case AFDC, and parental pathology
were correct, several things would be expected.
First, when the value of AFDC benefits were rising nonmarital
birth rates would increase. Presumably the converse would also be
couple expecting a child tries to make decisions such as whether Harold should
go to work or live with Phyllis. Id. Though Murray has complained that his
thought experiment has been unfairly lampooned, his depiction of a poor, young,
expectant couple engaging in a carefully calculated, thoroughly quantifiable,
rational cost-benefit analysis, will strike anyone who has any knowledge of poor
people, young people, or human beings in general, as unintentionally hilarious.
See Easton, supra note 133, at 16 (reporting on the ridicule given by advocates
and social scientists to Murray's "Harold and Phyllis" thought experiment); see
also JENCKS, supra note 47, at 80-85 (criticizing and responding to the "Harold
and Phyllis" thought experiments).
148 For an insightful discussion and critique of one state's child-exclusion
provision, see James M. Sullivan, The New Jersey Child Exclusion: Model or
Mess?, 2 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 127 (1994). Early versions of Republican
sponsored legislation to change the AFDC program have included child
exclusion. See, e.g., H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Title 1 (1995) (prohibiting the
use of block grants for providing cash benefits to minor children born to welfare
recipients).
149 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 46.
150 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 46.
151 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 46.
152 LIND, supra note 132, at 169.
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true: a reduction in the value of AFDC benefits would cause a drop
in the numbers of nonmarital births. Second, states with higher
AFDC benefits would experience rates of unmarried births greater
than states with lower benefits. Third, the average AFDC family
would be significantly larger than the average non-AFDC family,
because the AFDC program "rewards" additional births by
increasing the benefits' budget but, since no known employer
increases salary based upon family size, non-AFDC families
experience children as net costs to the household budget. In fact,
none of these three things turns out to happen in reality.
With regard to the data on nonmarital births, what appears to
be a dramatic increase in the rate of nonmarital births is much
more a reflection of a decrease in marital fertility than an increase
in nonmarital fertility.'53 In order to understand why that is so,
it is necessary to revisit data on fertility rates in the past four
decades.
For reasons other than the invention of rock and roll, the 1950s
was an extraordinary decade. During the 1950s Americans married
younger, became parents younger and, relative to the preceding and
succeeding decades, gave birth to more children. Thus marital
fertility experienced a dramatic increase in the 1950s, what is more
commonly called the "baby boom."'
' 54
During the 1960s and into the mid-1970s, however, marital
fertility experienced a sharp decline. Between 1960 and 1975 the
marital fertility rate fell by more than 40%. At the end of the
1950s, the marital fertility rate stood at 157 per 1000 married
women. By 1975, the rate had fallen to ninety-two births per 1000
married women. 55 The number of births per 1000 unmarried
women during the same period, what Murray identifies as the
beginning of the "illegitimacy crisis," remained roughly the same,
' LIND, supra note 132, at 170 (emphasis supplied). While this Article
agrees with Lind's critique of what he terms the conservative "illegitimacy
hoax," the Article relies for data and analysis of demographic trends on Sara
McLanahan & Lynne Casper, Growing Diversity and Inequality in the American
Family, in STATE OF THE UNION: AMERICA IN THE 1990s 10-12 (Reynolds
Farley ed., 1994).
114 McLanahan & Casper, supra note 153, at 10.
... McLanahan & Casper, supra note 153, at 10.
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but the nonmarital birth rate increased sharply. The reason for that
apparent increase was that even though the rate of nonmarital births
between 1960 and 1975 remained relatively constant (between
twenty-two and twenty-four per 1000 unmarried women), the
decline in marital fertility and delaying of marriage resulted in a
significant increase in the ratio of unmarried births to married
births. 15
6
In the simplest terms, since the "illegitimacy rate" of which
Murray speaks is a ratio of married births to unmarried births, the
rate can be increased in at least three ways: (1) an increase in
nonmarital fertility while marital fertility remains constant; (2) an
increase in nonmarital fertility surpassing that of a simultaneous
increase in marital fertility; or (3) as is the case in American
history between 1960 and 1975, a decrease in marital fertility while
nonmarital fertility remains constant.
In fairness, it should be noted that marital fertility rates levelled
off in the late 1970s and have not declined significantly since then.
Moreover, in absolute terms, nonmarital fertility rates since that
time have been on the rise. In 1960 the rate of births to unmarried
women was 21.6 per 1000 unmarried women.17 Ten years later,
the number stood at 26.4 per 1000 unmarried women.' By
1980, the rate of births for unmarried women was 29.4 per 1000;
and by 1990 the rate reached 43.8.15' The increase from 21.6 to
43.8 births per 1000 unmarried women may be a cause for
discussion. But the increase in nonmarital births hardly justifies the
"sky is falling" rhetoric of Murray and other conservatives. 160 It
should also be noted that in 1994 the rate of births to unmarried
women declined for the nation as a whole, from 30% to 26%, but
increased for older, wealthier women.' With regard to Black
rates of unmarried births, Christopher Lind writes:
56 McLanahan & Casper, supra note 153, at 11.
.-157 NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1991, at 199 tbl.1-77 (1995).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Murray, supra note 122, at A14.
161 More Older US. Women Having Babies Out of Wedlock, REUTERS N.
AM. WIRE, Nov. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuna File.
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According to a 1995 Census Bureau Report on Characteris-
tics of the Black Population, "the rate of babies being born
to unwed black teenagers-about 80 per 1000 unmarried
teenagers-remained virtually the same from 1920 through
1990." The rise in the number of illegitimate births from
23 percent in 1960 to 62 percent in 1992 reflects, not
greater fertility by poor blacks, but a significant decline in
the number of legitimate births among the non-poor black
majority. 112
What is most critical about these statistics to the conservative
argument about public assistance and unmarried births is not just
that the data reveal exaggerated and sensationalized claims by
authors like Murray. What is most critical is that the actual rate of
nonmarital fertility, for all races, showed little or no increase
precisely during that period (1960-1975) when both access to and
the value of welfare benefits was increasing. From 1975 to the
present, when the real value of food stamps and AFDC benefits fell
by 20%163 and median AFDC benefits declined by more than
40%, 164 unmarried fertility rates have risen unevenly. Thus the
first predicted consequence of the conservative argument, that
162 LIND, supra note 132, at 169 (quoting Claudette Bennett, The Black
Population in the United States, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS 20-480 (1995) (citations omitted)). While the thesis of
Lind's argument is sound, it should not give the impression that there has not
been an increase in the actual number of unmarried births, for the population as
a whole, and for Blacks in particular. Additionally, Lind's quotation on Census
Department Data requires clarification. For Black women 15- to 17-years-old, the
unmarried birth rate has hovered at about 80 per 1000 for the past six decades.
For Black women 18- to 19-years-old, the unmarried birth rate has gone from
128.4 in 1969 (the last year for which data were available to the author) to 141.6
in 1993. McLanahan & Casper, supra note 153, at tbl.6.
163 ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 16.
164 Janice L. Peterson & Carol Dawn Peterson, Single Mother Families and
the Dual Welfare State, 52 REv. Soc. ECON. 314, 323 (1994). In some states, the
decline has been even more pronounced. In Texas, for example, the inflation-
adjusted value of AFDC benefits has fallen 60% since 1970. Suzanne Gamboa,
Poverty's Unrelenting Grip on Texas: Thirty Years After LBJ Launched His
Great Society, Congress Wants to Give Responsibility for the Poor Back to the
States. What Have We Learned, and What Does the Future Hold for Texas'
Impoverished?, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Nov. 26, 1995, at Al.
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unmarried birth rates will rise and fall with the rise and fall of the
value of AFDC benefits, is contradicted by at least three decades
of census data.
Second, as noted above, if the conservative argument were true,
one would expect states with higher benefits to have unmarried
birth rates greater than states with lower benefits. Again, that does
not turn out to be the case. Mississippi and Alabama, for example,
provide the lowest AFDC benefits in the nation, yet have birth rates
significantly higher than states that provide much higher benefits.
In fact, the unmarried birth rates in Mississippi and Alabama are
among the highest in the nation. 165
Third, if the conservative argument about the connection
between poor relief and unmarried birth rates was correct, one
would expect a corollary of that argument to be that the heads of
households receiving AFDC benefits would maximize the number
of children they have in order to maximize the amount of their
benefits. As by now should be expected, nothing of the sort occurs
in reality. AFDC family size, between 1969 and 1992, declined by
more than 25%: from 4.0 persons (inclusive of adults) to 2.9
persons. 66 Extensive study of the family size of AFDC recipients
indicates that:
In 72.7 percent of the [AFDC] families, there are one or
two children. Another 15.5 percent have three children.
And there are four or more children in 10.1 percent of the
families. The average AFDC family is either about the
same size or slightly smaller than the average non-AFDC
family. 167
In this context it is also important to note that a favorite mantra
of conservative rhetoric to eliminate public assistance to poor
families and their children, "babies having babies," is also not born
out by reality. Only a very small percentage of AFDC mothers are
teenagers, 7.6%.161 Of that number, only 2% are fifteen or
younger. The vast majority, 90%, are over seventeen; 80% are over
165 ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 42.
166 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 46.
167 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 46.
168 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 46.
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eighteen; and somewhat more than 50% are over nineteen."'
During the 1950s, the golden era to which contemporary conserva-
tives look back with yearning, the birth rate for teenagers was
much higher than it is today, three decades after the war on poverty
was launched.170
What, then, is causing an increase in the number of single-
parent families? Answering that question would entail a far-
reaching analysis of cultural and economic trends in the United
States over the past forty years. Even more importantly, it must be
kept in mind that single-parenthood is a phenomenon that has
expanded across classes and races in this country, and in Western
Europe. It is, by no means, the exclusive province of the poor and
racial minorities.
Having said that, what does seem clear is that broader cultural
and economic forces are at work: a sharp decline in the real
earnings of young adults;' 7' changes in sexual mores; the lack of
effective sex education and difficulty in obtaining birth control for
teenagers; 72 larger numbers of women entering the work-force,
itself partly the result of the decline in family wages; greater
freedom on the part of women to refuse to enter or choose to leave
unhappy relationships; increased rates of incarceration of young
men, particularly among Blacks and the poor; and perhaps poverty
itself. Recent research indicates that "women who grow up in
169 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 46.
170 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 46.
'7' See infra Part IV.B. 1.C (comparing socio-economic trends between the
wealthiest and poorest classes in American society, and the correlation to child
poverty).
'72 See Douglas J. Besharov, The Contraceptive Gap: Millions for Cosmetics,
Pennies for Better Birth Control, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1995, at C1. (noting the
difficulties that many young women face in trying to avoid becoming pregnant.
These include problems, both real and perceived, with the available contraceptive
methods and deeply rooted convictions antagonistic to the use of contraceptives.).
Cf Jane Mauldon and Kristin Luker, Does Liberalism Cause Sex, AM. PROSPECT,
Winter 1996, at 80 (arguing that pregnancy rates among sexually active teenagers
have dropped and sex education programs have encouraged youth to limit
number of partners, delay sex, and use condoms).
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poverty are more likely than those from middle-class backgrounds
to become single parents."'
173
Without sentimentality, it does not seem irrational to speculate
that one of the reasons that poor people may choose to have
children outside of marriage is that one of the few consolations
available to those who live in poverty is intimacy with another
person. Parenthood is one privilege that the poor still enjoy with
the rich. Especially for a poor young woman who is not faring very
well in school and who suffers from low self-esteem, having a baby
may seem like a way to gain affirmation, attention, and respect.
Ann C. Divers-Stamnes, in her moving account of children in
one of this country's poorest communities, Lives in the Bal-
ance,174 confirms some of this speculation by her own extensive
observations of poor children in Watts:
For students who had never achieved, who had not been
able to succeed in school, who were in fact failing or
falling behind their peers, the production of a child was
considered an achievement of which they could be proud.
They became the center of attention as their peers admired
the baby, their accomplishment. The babies were handed
around and admired at the school. For some, it was a
chance to receive some desperately needed attention. One
young woman was excited to have a baby because the
infant received gifts of stuffed animals with which the
mother loved to play. A child herself, she enjoyed the toys
her infant daughter received. For those young women who
were lacking love in their lives, a child was a person of
their own to love. 17
5
Apart from providing an incentive for nonmarital births, poverty
also plays a significant role in causing single-parenthood through
divorce, abandonment, and separation. According to Census Bureau
173 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 174.
174 ANN C. DIVER-STAMNES, LIVES IN THE BALANCE: YOUTH, POVERTY,
AND EDUCATION IN WATTS (1995).
171 Id. at 43. Diver-Stamnes concludes her criticism of the argument that
AFDC payments induce poor women to have children outside of marriage with
the observation that "[aipplying for AFDC was a response to these young
mothers' new life situation, not the reason for it." Id. at 45.
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statistics on family dissolution, poor families, for both Whites and
Blacks, are twice as likely to break up than non-poor families, due,
the Census Bureau reasonably suggests, to the stresses arising from
being poor. 176
Non-marital births and single-parenthood are, of course, only
one of the behaviors to which conservatives point in locating the
problem of child poverty with poor parents. Crime, drug use,
incomplete educations, and, most importantly, unwillingness to
work are also among the most serious charges in the conservative
indictment of poor parents. As Richard Neuhaus has put it,
[t]he underclass is the most concentrated population of
those who cannot or will not cope when it comes to family
responsibility, education, work, and living within the
criminal law.
77
Later, this Article takes up, in the context of assessing the effect of
government relief programs on the poor, the question of whether
poor parents who receive AFDC are unwilling to work. For the rest
of the pathologies for which poor parents are blamed for their own
poverty, the previous discussion of unmarried fertility stands as a
paradigm. That is to say, when one examines the data carefully, the
putative pathologies of the poor either turn out to be nonexistent or
are more the consequence than the cause of poverty.178
Parental failures, however, are only a part of the conservative
explanation of child poverty. Another part, arguably an equally
important part, of the conservative explanation of the problem of
child poverty is misguided government intervention.
176 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 13 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STUDIES IN HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY FORMATION: WHEN HOUSEHOLDS
CONTINUE, DISCONTINUE, AND FORM 29-30 (1992)).
177 RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, AMERICA AGAINST ITSELF: MORAL VISION
AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 89 (1992).
178 See DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN: THE CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF
WORKING AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL "DOWNSIZING," 115-43
(1996) (providing a detailed rebuttal of the conservative argument on the "under-
class" and its supposed lack of values).
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2. Government Failures
The phrase, "[i]t takes a village to raise a child" has
validity only if the "village" is friends, extended family,
neighbors, and other privately assembled groups who can
reinforce the lessons of home. But if the "village" is
government, then the endeavor is doomed to fail.
-Dan Quayle & Diane Medved 7 9
As that quote from Dan Quayle and Diane Medved's book
makes clear, one of the fundamental convictions of the conservative
position on child poverty is that government has little, if any, role
in alleviating the problem. That conclusion follows ineluctably
from an even more fundamental premise of the conservative
position: government intervention on behalf of poor people in the
past thirty years has been an unmitigated disaster.
Robert Rector, in the title of an article18 that has been widely
cited and provided a mantra for conservative enemies of the welfare
state, described the last thirty years of government poor relief
efforts this way: "America's Failed $5.4 Trillion War on
Poverty."' 8' Rector's argument is perhaps the best single source
for a brief statement of all the major themes of conservative
rhetoric on poor relief. From its opening passages denying that
there is any significant material poverty in the United States; to its
progress through the litany of illegitimacy, laziness, welfare
179 DAN QUAYLE & DIANE MEDVED, THE AMERICAN FAMILY: DISCOVERING
THE VALUES THAT MAKE US STRONG 277 (1996). In what may have been a
conscious play on the most well known slogan of the National Rifle Association,
Quayle and Medved conclude their point with the words: "Governments don't
raise children. Parents do." Id. at 277.
'80 RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 54 (reprinted as a book).
'8' RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 54, at 23. Rector's article (reprinted as
a book) has been widely cited by conservative politicians and commentators. Its
basic argument can be found in a variety of conservative sources, including
House Bill 4, the so-called "welfare reform" bill introduced by conservatives in
the 104th Congress. See H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996). The proposed
bill's synopsis reads: "A bill to restore the American family, reduce illegitimacy,
control welfare spending, and reduce welfare dependence." Id.
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dependency, and crime as the reasons the poor are poor; to its
concluding prophecies about the emerging White underclass;
Rector's piece epitomizes the conservative position on poor relief.
For that reason alone it is worth quoting at length:
Despite massive spending, in many respects the fate of
lower income Americans has become worse, not better, in
the last quarter century. Today, one child in seven is being
raised on welfare through the AFDC program . . . . In
welfare, as in most other things, you get what you pay for.
For thirty years the welfare system has paid for non-work
and non-marriage and has achieved massive increases in
both. By undermining the work ethic and rewarding
illegitimacy, the welfare system insidiously generates its
own clientele. The more that is spent, the more people in
apparent need of aid who appear. The government is
trapped in a cycle in which spending generates illegitimacy
and dependency, which in turn generate demands for even
greater spending.1 8
2
Stated most succinctly, the conservative position on the effect
of government intervention to ameliorate child poverty has three
points: (1) the federal government has engaged in massive spending
on means-tested poor relief in the past thirty years; (2) that
spending has done little to reduce poverty, particularly child
poverty; and (3) the observable effects of federal spending on poor
relief are uniformly negative-an increase in nonmarital births and
family breakdown and an undermining of a work ethic among the
poor that has resulted in so-called "welfare dependency."'8 3 The
conservative position does not merely believe that government poor
relief programs do not help to prevent poverty. The conservative
position holds that government programs to help the poor actually
create poverty.
In a manner analogous to the way in which this Article
investigated Charles Murray's purported crisis in nonmarital births,
182 RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 54, at 23.
183 See Spencer Rich, Behind Reagan's Welfare Study, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,
1986, at A7 (discussing the Reagan administration's view of "welfare depen-
dency" and the "welfare culture").
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each of the above-stated premises will now be examined. For the
third premise, having dealt with the issue of nonmarital births and
family breakdown, the discussion will instead focus on the so-
called problem of welfare dependency.
Rector's first premise is that federal and state governments have
engaged in massive spending on what he terms "welfare." In its
popular usage "welfare" stands for the cash assistance, nutritional
assistance, and medical insurance afforded the poorest citizens-in
other words, AFDC (or for single adults and childless couples in
some states, Home Relief or General Assistance), food stamps, and
Medicaid. Rector, exploiting the rhetorical advantage of the
negative connotation of "welfare" in the public mind, uses the term,
however, to encompass every means-tested program sponsored by
the federal government. 184 Thus Rector's list of seventy-eight
programs predictably contains AFDC, food stamps, State General
Assistance, Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), and Medicaid;
but also includes programs such as General Assistance to Indians,
Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants ("SEOG"), Fellow-
ships for Graduate and Professional Study for Disadvantaged
Minorities, Pell Grants, and the Earned Income Tax Credit
("EITC"). 5 By adding up the monies spent on all federal means-
tested programs since 1963, Rector comes up with his figure (in
adjusted dollars) of $5.4 trillion.1 6
The shortest accurate response to this assertion of Rector comes
from Political Consultant James Carville: "[N]ot in our wildest
dreams have we spent that much."'8 7 A more elaborate refutation
may, however, be in order.
First, as noted above, Rector includes in his list of anti-poverty
programs (drawn from the Congressional Research Service) a
184 Robert Rector, The US. Welfare System: Means-Tested Assistance
Programs and Aid to Economically Distressed Communities in Fiscal Year 1993
(Heritage Found. Reps.), July 1, 1995, at 47. This piece serves as an appendix
to Rector's article. It consists of an alphabetical (by category) listing of all state
and federal means-tested programs with expenditures for fiscal years 1990-1992.
85 Id.
186 id.
187 JAMES CARVILLE, WE'RE RIGHT, THEY'RE WRONG 25 (1996). Carville
then adds, "and we don't do nearly enough (to assist poor people)." Id.
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number of programs that are not targeted toward nor used by
people beneath the poverty line, or the population that qualifies for
AFDC. SEOG grants, for example, have no upper income threshold
for eligibility.' 8 The Special Programs for Students from Disad-
vantaged Backgrounds require that at least two-thirds of recipients
be low income, defined as family incomes not in excess of 150%
of the poverty line, but fully one-third of beneficiaries need not be
low-income.'89 Fellowships for Graduate and Professional Study
for Disadvantaged Minorities are awarded on the basis of a national
competition among educational institutions and are based on the
"financial need" of candidates who may or may not fall at or
beneath the poverty line. The EITC, among the largest items on
Rector's list, also benefits many families with incomes above the
poverty line. 90
The obvious conservative retort to this line of criticism is that
it is quibbling. The really big-ticket items-AFDC, food stamps,
and especially Medicaid-have eligibility criteria expressly linked
to the poorest citizens. Granting that, for the sake of argument, the
first premise of Rector's argument still does not hold up.
If the total number of adjusted dollars spent on means-tested
programs is viewed in absolute terms, it is obvious that Rector has
wildly overstated government spending on the poor. As Robert
Greenstein, in his testimony before the Human Resources Sub-
committee of the House Ways and Means Committee pointed out,
total federal spending for programs for low-income people was
$177 billion in 1994,'9' slightly more than 12% of the federal
budget. Providing medical assistance is by far the single most
.8 SEOG eligibility depends upon the "expected family payment" which is
determined by such non-income factors as family size, number of children in
college, cost of the college's tuition, value of family assets, etc. Rector, supra
note 184, at 47.
189 Rector, supra note 184, at 47.
190 Rector, supra note 184, at 47.
191 CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS
WELFARE REVISION, TESTIMONY OF ROBERT GREENSTEIN, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, Jan. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File
[hereinafter GREENSTEIN].
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costly government expenditure on poor people, and the great bulk
of that money goes to Medicaid.' 92
In 1993, for example, the federal, state, and local governments
spent only $25 billion on AFDC, but nearly $132 billion on
Medicaid. 93 In fact, of the six programs for poor relief on which
local, state, and the federal government spent money, Medicaid cost
more than the other five combined: (1) Medicaid-$ 132 billion; (2)
SSI-$26 billion; (3) food stamps-$26 billion; (4) AFDC-$25
billion; (5) low-income housing subsidies-$20 billion; and (6)
Head Start and other compensatory education programs-$ 10
billion. 194 Less than one-fifth of Medicaid spending, however, is
on medical services for families receiving AFDC. 95 As Robert
Greenstein observes:
The average cost of Medicaid services for a child receiving
AFDC is only about one-quarter the cost of caring for an
elderly Medicaid recipient and about one-seventh the cost
of caring for a disabled individual. 96
If viewed in relative terms, the rhetorical effect of Rector's
purported $5.4 billion dollars of government spending in means-
tested programs is diminished even further. Since 1965, total
federal spending has equaled, in adjusted dollars, $31 trillion. The
total Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") over the same period, in
adjusted dollars, was $143 trillion. Thus, even if one accepts
Rector's accounting of poor relief programs-an accounting that
includes many programs that benefit people with incomes above the
poverty line-the percentage spent by the U.S. government on
means-tested programs does not seem that great: 16% of total
federal spending and 4% of total GDP.197 If AFDC is considered
alone, the percentage of federal spending over the last thirty years
drops to 1.5%.198 By contrast, since 1945, Department of Defense
192 Id.
"' Susan Mayer & Christopher Jencks, War on Poverty: No Apologies,
Please, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at A29.
194 Id.
195 GREENSTEIN, supra note 191.
196 GREENSTEIN, supra note 191.
197 GREENSTEIN, supra note 191.
198 GREENSTEIN, supra note 191.
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expenditures on the nuclear weapons program alone averaged more
than three times as much per year.' 99
Rector's argument, however, does not fall apart because the
"massive" government spending it alleges turns out not to be nearly
as massive as Rector makes it out to be. Even if Rector were to
concede that spending on poor relief were only one-half, or even
one-tenth, of what he claims, his second premise, that the money
spent on government poor relief programs has done little or nothing
to relieve poverty, would still prove a powerful indictment of those
programs. The question, then, is whether Rector's second premise
can withstand critical scrutiny. Is it, in fact, correct to say that "the
fate of lower income Americans has become worse, not better" as
a result of federal welfare spending?2 °°
In responding to that question, the first point to be made is that
none of the programs that made up the "War on Poverty" or
constitute the current system of poor relief in the United States
were designed to lift people out of poverty. The popular metaphor
of a safety net is useful in this respect: a safety net does not keep
one on one's feet or prevent one from falling, it merely sets a
lower, non-lethal, limit to the depth of one's descent.20 ' Only in
Alaska and Hawaii, for example, do the effect of AFDC and food
stamps bring a family above the poverty line.202 In every other
state, even with full AFDC and food stamp assistance, poor
mothers and their children remain below the poverty line. Because
of the steady erosion of the value of AFDC benefits and food
19 Stephen I. Schwartz, Four Trillion Dollars and Counting, 51 BULLETIN
OF THE ATOM. SCIENTIST 32 (Nov. 1995). The $80 billion figure is in adjusted
1995 dollars. Schwartz, based upon a Brookings Institute Study he co-authored,
estimates that, since 1945, the federal government has spent at least $4 trillion
on the nuclear weapons program alone, and believes that the actual figure may
be as much as $5 trillion. Using the lower figure of $4 trillion, dividing by the
fifty years between 1945 and 1995 (the end date of the Brookings Institute
study), the average annual federal expenditure on nuclear weapons was $80
billion per year-more than three times the $25 billion spent on AFDC in 1993.
200 RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 54, at 23.
20' See infra Part IV.B.2-V (discussing the meagerness of the U.S. system
of poor relief, including AFDC).
202 Maureen Harrington, Perceptions of Poor Clouded by Emotion, DENVER
POST, June 19, 1995, at Al.
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stamps, between 1979 and 1992, the percent of single-parent
families lifted out of poverty by government assistance fell from
39% to 25%.203
Despite the paltry and ever-diminishing value of government
assistance to poor people in the United States, the ameliorative
effect of that assistance has been significant. Two respected social
scientists who have studied both poverty and the welfare system,
Susan Mayer, professor of public policy at the University of
Chicago, and Christopher Jencks, professor of sociology at
Northwestern University, have conducted an assessment of the
effects of federal, state, and local spending on programs for poor
people since 1965.204 Their conclusions stand in striking contrast
to the contention that the "War on Poverty" has accomplished little
or nothing.
Mayer and Jencks note that every major poor relief program the
federal government has undertaken has demonstrated significant
success in alleviating the effects of poverty.2 5 In housing, for the
past twenty years federal funds for low-income housing assistance
have gone toward helping poor families pay their rent, not toward
the notorious "projects" that dominate the conservative caricature
of public housing. The private units that government funds have
helped poor families obtain are, in most respects, decent housing.
As Mayer and Jencks note:
The Census Bureau's housing survey shows that nearly
every measure of poor families' housing conditions has
improved since the early 1970's. The poor are less likely
to have holes in their floors, cracks in their walls or
ceilings, and leaky roofs. They are more likely to have
complete plumbing, central heat and electrical outlets in
every room.206
Government programs have also significantly alleviated the
problem of hunger among the poorest people in the United States.
Results of the National Food Consumption Survey have shown that
203 ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 17.
204 Mayer & Jencks, supra note 193, at A29.
205 Mayer & Jencks, supra note 193, at A29.
206 Mayer & Jencks, supra note 193, at A29.
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the food stamp program has had a significant effect on reducing
hunger and malnutrition, reducing by half the effect of family
income on food consumption.2 7
In medical care and education, government spending on
programs to assist the poor has done much, if not enough.
Medicaid, although afflicted by the rapid inflation of health costs
that have affected the U.S. health care system generally, has been
effective in improving access to medical care for the nation's
poorest people.2 °8 Various compensatory education programs like
Head Start have often demonstrated that children enrolled in such
programs perform better than similarly situated unenrolled peers.
While it is true that the advantages conferred by such programs
seem to fade when children are withdrawn from the programs,
nevertheless, the reduction in the proportion of seventeen-year-olds
who have very low math and reading skills may be interpreted as
a sign that compensatory education programs are having a
cumulative beneficial effect.20 9
The group that has profited most from federal poor relief
programs stands at the opposite end, from children, on the age
spectrum: the elderly. The combination of indexing Social Security
benefits to inflation, and the creation of the SSI program in 1972,
have coincided with a marked drop in poverty rates among the
elderly: from 19% in 1972, to 15% in 1982, and to 12% in
1992.210
Finally, with regard to AFDC, the program was designed to be
and remains the least expensive way in which to provide for
dependent children, in the care of a parent (mother), within a
private household. Though its benefits are meager, the AFDC
program keeps millions of women and dependent children from
homelessness and hunger. A Rutgers University study of women in
states with low AFDC benefits found that such women and their
207 Mayer & Jencks, supra note 193, at A29.
208 Mayer & Jencks, supra note 193, at A29.
209 Mayer & Jencks, supra note 193, at A29.
210 Mayer & Jencks, supra note 193, at A29.
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children were significantly more likely to experience various
hardships, including going without food and losing housing. t '
Once it is acknowledged that government poor relief programs
in the United States are, by design, a palliative for and not a
prophylactic against poverty, the unfairness of the conservative
criticism of programs to assist the poor becomes all the more
apparent. The conservative allegation about the ineffectiveness of
such programs amounts to this: the programs have been in
existence for thirty years and not only is there still poverty in the
United States, but the number of poor people is growing. The
defense to that allegation is that programs cannot be rationally
accused of failing to fulfill a purpose for which they were not
intended and have not been adequately funded. The only fair
standard of judgment to use-the only standard justified by the
history, structure, and funding of poor relief programs in the United
States-is the degree to which programs like AFDC have dimin-
ished the worst aspects of being poor. As the research of Jencks
and Mayer indicates, by that criterion government poor relief
programs have had significant success.
It is incumbent upon those who claim that government poor
relief programs have accomplished nothing to answer this question
directly. What would have been the consequences had programs
like AFDC, food stamps, SSI, and Medicaid not existed? In the
past thirty years, under those programs alone, millions of meals
have been served to hungry children and elderly people; countless
months of rent and utilities have been paid; tens of millions of
prescriptions have been filled, vaccinations administered, bones set,
infections treated, and life-saving surgical procedures performed.
Surely the suffering of poor people, and the dehumanizing effects
of poverty, would have been much, much greater had programs like
AFDC not existed.
The conservative position has only two responses to that
challenge: (1) in the absence of government poor relief programs,
a combination of private charity, self-help, and market forces would
21 Jason DeParle, Less Is More: Faith and Facts About Welfare Reform,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, §4, at 1 (reporting on study by Rutgers University
Sociologist Kathryn Edin of women in high and low AFDC benefits states).
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have provided all those meals, months of rent, and medical care; or
(2) the nation would have been better off if the poor people, nearly
two-thirds of them children, who made use of those services never
received them.
The overwhelming majority of Americans are likely to greet the
first response with howls of derisive laughter, and the second with
cries of moral outrage. For that reason, whatever the demands of
common decency and intellectual honesty, advocates for the
conservative position are unlikely ever to speak openly either of
those responses. However refreshing such candor, it would
constitute a rhetorical disaster.
What remains of this consideration of the conservative critique
of government poor relief programs of the past thirty years is to
interrogate its third premise, namely, that those programs have
encouraged what Robert Rector calls "behavioral poverty," '212 that
is, various forms of social pathology on the part of the poor. Chief
among those alleged pathologies, older in its ideological pedigree
than even illegitimacy, is indolence, an unwillingness to work. The
evidence offered by the conservative position for the undermining
effect of poor relief programs on the work ethic of the poor is the
phenomenon of so-called "welfare dependency," that is to say, the
apparent tendency of some AFDC recipients to remain on welfare
rolls for long periods of time and, in some cases, for the children
and grandchildren of those recipients to rely on AFDC when they
become adults.
1 3
There are three responses that can be made to the indolence
argument: (1) AFDC benefits simply are not great enough to
discourage work; (2) fully half of families that receive AFDC leave
the welfare rolls within two years, and nearly two-thirds leave
within four years; and (3) a significant percentage of women who
receive AFDC assistance do work while receiving benefits, and an
even larger percentage actively seek work while on AFDC.
212 RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 54, at 24.
213 See, e.g., Mona Charen, GOP Deserves the High Ground, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Mar. 28, 1995, at 9A; Representative Clay Shaw, Republican Response
to President Clinton's Weekly Radio Address (radio broadcast Jan. 13, 1996)
(transcript on file with Journal of Law and Policy).
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It is a point that has been made before in this Article and will
be made again at greater length. Nevertheless, it bears repeating
here: AFDC benefits are extraordinarily paltry. The average
monthly AFDC benefit for a family of three in 1992 was $374.00,
about 40% of the poverty line.214
With regard to the average length of stay on AFDC rolls, the
first point to be made is that frequently opponents of poor relief
programs engage in a kind of statistical sleight-of-hand to make the
number of long-term AFDC recipients appear greater than it
actually is. The mechanism by which that illusion is accomplished
is a simple one: opponents of poor relief programs will present a
"snapshot" picture of AFDC roles. In other words, before present-
ing some startling statistic on the number of long-term AFDC
recipients, opponents of the program, at least the more conscien-
tious among them, will preface the statistic with the words "on any
given day." The illusion created by such statistics is explained in
a 1994 study of the House Ways and Means Committee.
Consider a 13-bed hospital in which 12 beds are occupied
for an entire year by 12 chronically ill patients, while the
other bed is used by 52 patients, each of whom stays
exactly 1 week. On any given day, a hospital census would
find that about 85% of the patients (12/13) were in the
midst of long spells of hospitalization. Nevertheless,
viewed over the course of a year, short-term use clearly
dominates: out of 64 patients using hospital services, about
80% (52/64) spent only 1 week in the hospital.215
By analogy, a state may have any average of 10,000 people, on any
one day, receiving AFDC. Stipulate that in a given year, the state
has 120,000 people who receive AFDC: 8000 for the whole year,
112,000 for a period of one month or less. If the conservative
governor of the state looks at the welfare rolls on any given day,
he will be technically correct in saying that 80% (8000/10,000) of
the AFDC recipients on any given day are long term. In fact,
214 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 6.9.
215 Joel Handler, Ending Welfare as We Know It-Wrong for Welfare, Wrong
for Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 14 (1994) (citing COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, 1994 GREEN BOOK (1994)).
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however, the vast majority of recipients in this hypothetical state
(112,000/120,000 or 93.3%) are short term recipients.
In the United States as a whole, only 11.8% of households
received any AFDC funds during the 1980s;216 4.3% of house-
holds received at least $1.00 of AFDC for three to seven years,
with 2% receiving at least $1.00 of AFDC for eight to ten
217years. A 1984 study of daughters in families that had received
AFDC found that the great majority of those daughters did not
receive AFDC as adults. 218 As a portion of total AFDC recipients,
50% of recipients are on the welfare rolls for two years or less.
Sixty-two percent (62%) remain on the rolls no longer than four
211years. If monthly statistics are examined, the movement on and
off AFDC rolls are even more pronounced.22 °
It is true that many AFDC families will recycle through the
system. Departures and returns to AFDC rolls are driven, however,
by job acquisition and loss; the next point to consider in refuting
the indolence argument.
The most important point to be made about work and women
on AFDC is that a significant percentage of them hold jobs, almost
invariably minimum wage jobs, while on welfare. A study of
Census Bureau data on Income from 1984 to 1989, by the Institute
for Women's Policy Research, found that 43% of mothers who had
received AFDC benefits, for at least two months in the past two
years, work an average of 950 hours per year.22 ' The study found
216 COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, 1994 GREEN BOOK 446 tbl.10-46
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 GREEN BOOK].
217 Id.
218 Id. at 447-49 tbl.10-48.
219 Handler, supra note 215, at 14; see Time on Welfare and Welfare
Dependency: Hearings on Welfare Time Limits Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996) (providing the statement of Dr. Ladonna A. Pavetti, research associate at
the Urban Institute).
220 Handler, supra note 215, at 14.
221 Welfare to Work: The Job Opportunities ofAFDC Recipients, RESEARCH-
IN-BRIEF (Inst. for Women's Pol'y Res., Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1995 [hereinafter
Welfare to Work](summarizing study of U.S. Bureau of the Census' Survey of
Income and Program Participation (1984-1989) involving sample of 1181 AFDC
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that the jobs worked by AFDC mothers paid an average (in 1990
dollars) of $4.29 per hour.2 22 The low pay and absence of bene-
fits of the jobs found by AFDC mothers was not surprising. Most
of those jobs were in the lowest-wage occupations predominantly
held by women, for example, maids, waitresses, cashiers, nursing
aides, and childcare workers. 23
A 1995 University of Tennessee study found somewhat lower
rates of job participation, while receiving AFDC, by adult AFDC
recipients. The basic findings of the study, however, support the
conclusion that a significant percentage of adult recipients of AFDC
work, and work for very little pay.
The Tennessee study reported that 20% of the state's AFDC
heads-of-households (caretakers) were employed while receiving
AFDC, 60% of them in jobs paying $5.00 or less. 224 Half of the
employed AFDC caretakers worked at least twenty-six hours per
week; 56.6% of AFDC caretakers had worked sometime in the
previous thirty-six months. More than one-quarter or 26.8% of the
caretakers who did not work gave health problems as the
reason.225 Lack of transportation and childcare, and unavailability
of jobs were also reported by non-working caretakers as reasons
they were not employed.226 Studies done in other states have
found similar results.227
A 20% employment rate among adult AFDC recipients may not
seem very significant. When one considers that the real rate of
mothers, representing about 2.8 million women or 80% of all adult AFDC
recipients) (on file with Journal of Law and Policy).
222 Id. at 214.
223 Id.
224 CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, UNIV, OF TENN., AID
TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN: 1995 CASE CHARACTERISTICS STUDY
xv (1996) [hereinafter TENNESSEE STUDY].
225 Id. at xv.
226 Id.
227 Joel F. Handler, Women, Families, Work and Poverty: A Cloudy Future,
6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 375, 398-99 (noting that virtually all of the AFDC
recipients polled in Chicago, Illinois, obtained additional income to cover their
expenses. This article also states that this study has been replicated in Cambridge,
Charleston, and San Antonio with the same results).
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unemployment is estimated at 14%;228 that these workers are
among the least educated and most disadvantaged in the work-
force;229 and the obstacles they face in securing adequate child
care and transportation to and from work, the 20% figure seems
quite impressive.
Moreover, the 20% figure-mothers on AFDC who are working
without any assistance in securing or keeping jobs-is about half
of the employment rate of the most successful welfare-to-work
program ever run. In the summer of 1995, the Manpower Demon-
stration Research Corporation of New York issued a report on a
program in three cities,230 in which welfare recipients were
required to seek jobs in order to continue to receive benefits. Only
about 50% of the participants in the experiment found jobs, and
after two years their average income, while having risen 26%, was
still only $285.00 per month.23' Similarly, a Brookings Institution
study that tracked a group of working welfare recipients from 1979
to 1990, found that, after inflation, their wages rose only about six
232cents per hour per year.
Ultimately, an adequate response to the conservative explanation
for why parents are poor and, by extension, why so many children
are poor, requires an alternative account of the causes of poverty.
It is to such an account that the discussion now turns.
B. Economic Forces and Government Policies
Pauperism is the hospital of the active labour-army and the
dead weight of the industrial reserve army. Its production
is included in that of the relative surplus population, its
necessity implied by their necessity; along with the surplus
population, pauperism forms a condition of capitalist
228 Lester Thurow, The Crusade That's Killing Prosperity, AM. PROSPECT,
Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 54, 56.
229 TENNESSEE STUDY, supra note 224, at xv (reporting that 54.6% of AFDC
caretakers had not completed 12 years of school, and only 40% had high school
diploma).
230 DeParle, supra note 211, §4, at 1.
231 Id.
232 id
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production, and of the capitalist development of wealth. It
forms part of the faux frais ("incidental expenses") of
capitalist production: but capital usually knows how to
transfer these from its own shoulders to those of the
working class and the petty bourgeoisie.
-Marx 2
33
Why are the parents of so many children poor? One answer to
that question has already been examined: they are poor because of
their own faults, made worse by the misguided intervention of
government. There are, however, other answers to the question of
why people are poor. One of those answers, one that this Article
will term "the progressive response," locates the problem of
poverty in the interaction of two realities: an economic system that
fails to provide enough jobs that pay a living wage and a political
system that does not do enough to compensate for that failure.
Before turning to examine the premises of the progressive
response, it would be remiss not to recall that there are other ways
of answering the question "Why are people poor?" beyond treating
the poor as villains responsible for their own undoing, or treating
the poor as victims of larger macroeconomic forces. One kind of
approach, an approach that long commanded the respect of many
decent, intelligent people, is typified in the quotation from Marx
with which this section began.
This particular kind of approach to the problem of why people
are poor, sometimes termed "structuralist" but including "func-
tionalism" as it is broadly understood, takes seriously the possibility
that poverty may not be a merely incidental and universally
unwanted defect of a set of economic and political arrange-
ments.234 Rather, this approach to the problem of poverty inquires
whether, despite all the pious rhetoric about dreaming of a day
when no child goes to bed hungry, the existence of poor people and
233 MARX, supra note 1, at 797.
234 For a highly critical, and frequently unfair, discussion of structuralist and
functionalist approaches to social analysis, see ANTHONY FLEW, THINKING
ABOUT SOCIAL THINKING 105-12 (2d ed. 1995).
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the evident nature of their suffering serves certain powerful social
interests.
For Marx, the answer was clear: the maintenance of the poor in
their affliction is necessary for the maintenance of the rich in their
comfort. The poor represent a constant pool of reserve labor. By
keeping the labor supply plentiful, indeed by keeping the labor
supply well above that which can be employed at any one time by
the productive economy, capitalism thereby depresses labor costs.
The presence of the poor, and the witness of their misery, also
serve as a reminder of the penalties for failing to work. That fear,
which nothing can keep more palpable than the sight of impov-
erished children begging in the streets, also serves to heighten the
insecurity of workers, thereby undermining class solidarity, and
making it unlikely that organized collective action will ever be
taken against the owners of the means of production.
Such an analysis of poverty may strike the post-Cold War
reader as outdated Communist cant. Yet this kind of analysis of the
problem of poverty, or at least related kinds of analysis, can be
found in works of some of the most respected scholars in the field
of welfare policy. Herbert Gans, for example, has analyzed anti-
poverty policy in the United States in terms of the interests that are
served by labelling one group of people as a morally and intellectu-
ally deficient, and therefore undeserving "underclass."23 5 Gans
considers thirteen different purposes236 that are realized by
treating the poor as underserving, including the idea of the poor as
an army of reserve labor.237
The point in raising the examples of Marx and Gans is not to
dwell at any length on the analysis of poverty they provide. That
task is undoubtedly worthwhile, but not within the purview of this
Article. Being cognizant of structuralist and functionalist
approaches to the existence of so many impoverished people
provides a corrective for the progressive response to the problem
of poverty: that poverty might not be too blithely treated as the
235 HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS
AND ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 2 (1995).
236 Id. at 91-102.
237 Id. at 94.
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unhappy accident of the historically contingent intersection of
certain economic and political trends.
1. Economic Forces
In the past two decades, the United States economy has
exhibited three trends that have a direct bearing on the poverty rate
generally and, specifically, the poverty of children. The first of
those trends is the decrease in full-time employment, both in terms
of the increase in overall unemployment rates, and the increase in
part-time or temporary positions in place of what were formerly
full-time work situations. The second is the decline of real wages.
The third trend is a marked increase in income inequality. In their
separate and cumulative effect, those trends have resulted in an
increase in child poverty rates.
a. Rising Unemployment and Underemployment
For the past four decades, the unemployment rate in the United
States has grown steadily and significantly: from an average of
4.5% in the 1950s; to 4.8% in the 1960s; to 6.2% in the 1970s; to
7.3% in the 1980s.2 8 Since the recession of 1992, unemployment
rates have hovered around 6%.239 For Blacks, the official
unemployment rate was about twice that.240
The official unemployment rate does not include people who
want to work but cannot because of child-care or transportation
problems; people who are involuntary part-time employees; and so-
called "discouraged" workers, or people who have given up looking
for work. 24' To that extent, the official unemployment rate no
doubt understates the true extent of under- and unemployment. As
the economist Lester Thurow writes:
238 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 54 fig.5.
239 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 55.
240 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 63.
241 As Holly Sklar points out, "The official [unemployment] rate doesn't
include would-be workers who have searched for work in the past year, or even
the last five weeks-but not in the past four weeks." SKLAR, supra note 22, at
60.
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If we combine the 7.5 to 8 million officially unemployed
workers, the 5 to 6 million people who are not working but
who do not meet any of the tests for being active in the
workforce and are therefore not considered unemployed,
and the 4.5 million part-time workers who would like full-
time work, there are 17 to 18.5 million Americans looking
for more work. This brings the real unemployment rate to
almost 14 percent.2
42
Even a rate of 14% does not capture the full extent of unem-
ployment and underemployment in the United States. Fully 4% of
the workforce, roughly 5.8 million males between the ages of
twenty-five to sixty, is simply "missing" from labor statistics. 243
Those males show up in Census Bureau data on the population, but
are not reflected in employment or unemployment statistics. 244
There is reasonable speculation that some of those missing men are
homeless, some may be employed in the underground econ-
omy.245 Neither of those explanations, though, can account for all
the missing males. Finally, if one adds to the total the 10.1 million
Americans who work in temporary jobs or "on call," and the
approximately eleven million documented and undocumented
immigrants who entered the United States between 1980 and 1993,
it becomes apparent that "one has a sea of unemployed workers,
underemployed workers, and newcomers looking for work. 246
Negative trends in national employment statistics have been
even more severe in the nation's cities where the largest concen-
trations of poor people live. In New York City, for example,
between 1989 and 1992 alone the city lost 326,000 jobs.247
242 Thurow, supra note 228, at 56. In the 20 years between 1970 and 1990,
temporary employment expanded at a rate almost four times that of all
employment. Involuntary part-time employment also expanded significantly, up
121% from 1970 to 1990. FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 2.4.
243 Id.
244 Thurow, supra note 228, at 56.
245 Thurow, supra note 228, at 56.
246 Thurow, supra note 228, at 56.
247 LiZ KRUEGER & PATRICIA SWANN, WORK TO BE DONE: REPORT OF THE
[MANHATTAN] BOROUGH PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION, EMPLOY-
MENT, AND WELFARE 21(1995).
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In 1995, the city had 855,783 people receiving AFDC; 59,008
receiving Home Relief (General Assistance) as families; and
225,662 receiving Home Relief as single adults. The total number
of persons receiving public assistance in New York City for 1995
was 1,140,453.248 If one subtracts from that total the number of
children on AFDC (580,248 or 51% of the total) and disabled
adults classified as "unemployable" (220,000), that leaves 340,000
adults on public assistance on any given day in need of employ-
ment.249
There are, however, an average of 50,000 job openings on any
given day in New York. Many of those jobs require levels of
education, experience, and training far above those possessed by the
average recipient of public assistance. Still, even if every public
assistance recipient were qualified to take an available job, there
would still be 290,000 fewer jobs than people on public assistance
in need of them. That figure does not take into account the roughly
200,000 unemployed people who are not public assistance recipi-
ents who, on any given day, are also competing for those jobs.25 °
What accounts for the increase in unemployment? Partly, the
increase may be driven by the decline in world economic growth
from an average of 5% in the 1960s, to 3.6% in the 1970s, to 2.8%
in the 1980s, to 2% in the 1990s.2 1 A decline in productivity (in
this context defined as the ratio of output to total hours worked),
from a growth rate of 62.2% between 1955 and 1973, to 23.8%
from 1974 to 1992, may also contribute to the consistent expansion
of the ranks of the unemployed in the United States. 2
National macroeconomic policy decisions, however, have also
played a significant part in exacerbating the problem of unemploy-
ment. In the area of fiscal policy, an obsession with balancing the
federal budget, and the spending cuts that have come with it, have
had a contracting effect on the economy. Besides disabling the
federal government from engaging in public works spending to
248 Id
249 Id.
250 Id
2' Thurow, supra note 228, at- 55.
252 Thurow, supra note 228, at 57.
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create jobs, the reduction in federal spending to achieve a balanced
budget has also resulted in a real loss of jobs and benefits.253
In the area of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve under the
leadership of Paul Volcker and then Alan Greenspan, has pursued
monetary policies that have kept inflation extraordinarily low at the
price of high unemployment.254 The "nonaccelerating-inflation-
rate of unemployment" ("NAIRU"), or what some economists call
the "Natural Rate of Unemployment," is a concept that now forms
part of the core of macroeconomic orthodoxy among economists in
the United States. It is the rate below which economists believe
inflation will not only rise-as in the older Phillips curve model of
the rates of inflation and unemployment operating in an inverse
relationship-but accelerate.255 Accordingly, whenever actual
unemployment falls below the NAIRU, the Federal Reserve acts to
tighten the money supply, thereby contracting the economy and
warding off imagined fears of accelerating inflation. For example,
in 1994, when the NAIRU was estimated at 6%, the official
unemployment rate fell to 5.8%.256 While there was no evidence
of any threat of accelerating inflation, the Federal Reserve raised
interest rates. Once the unemployment rate had again risen to 6%,
the Federal Reserve relaxed its hold on the money supply.2 57
In short, government and capital, following the lead of the
financial markets, have adopted as their goal a low wage, very low
inflation economy. To achieve that goal, unemployment must
remain high.
253 See, e.g., Frank Riessman, The Balanced Budget Myth, TIKKUN, May-
June 1996, at 54.
254 See, e.g., SKLAR, supra note 22, at 55; Robert Eisner, Our NAIRULimit:
The Governing Myth of Economic Policy, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1995, at 58
(criticizing the Federal Reserve's "war on inflation, which is low, at the expense
of employment"); James K. Galbraith, The Surrender of Economic Policy, AM.
PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 60-67 (providing graphs showing estimates of
NAIRU and the relationship between inflation and unemployment).
255 Galbraith, supra note 254, at 61.
256 Galbraith, supra note 254, at 62.
257 Galbraith, supra note 254, at 62. Galbraith points out, however, that the
Federal Reserve began cutting interest rates in July 1995, even though the
unemployment rate was slightly below 6%.
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This constitutes one of the great internal contradictions of the
conservative position on poor relief. No one suggests that capital-
ism maintains a full-employment economy. No one disputes that
when the Federal Reserve, to the cheers of bond markets, raises
interest rates the intended effect is to depress employment. The
conservative position embraces the low wage, low inflation
economic policy now pursued by both the Federal Reserve and,
despite protestations that President Bill Clinton is a liberal, the
federal government. At the same time, however, the conservative
position on poor relief is that every recipient can and should get a
job-something which, were it to become an empirical reality,
would undoubtedly lower the unemployment rate beneath the
NAIRU of 6%. That would trigger the raising of interest rates by
the Federal Reserve, thereby contracting the money supply,
resulting in a rise in unemployment.
The contradiction is so blatant as to be unworthy of belaboring.
Nevertheless, it remains almost entirely unspoken by conservatives
or their liberal opponents in government.
b. Declining Wages
In 1979, then chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Paul
Volcker, in describing the measures he believed were necessary to
reduce inflation, declared that "[t]he standard of living of the
average American has to decline." '258 Volcker's pronouncement
would prove not only an accurate forecast of things to come, but
also a good description of what was then taking place. For more
than twenty years, American workers have been laboring longer for
less money. 9 In constant dollars, from 1973 to 1993, the aver-
age weekly wages of production and nonsupervisory workers (who
make up 80% of the workforce) declined by 16.1%. The average
258 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 17; Steven Rattner, Volcker Asserts U.S. Must
Trim Living Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1979, at Al.
259 For the best single work on this subject, see JULIET B. SCHOR, THE
OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEIsURE (1992). In
this widely acclaimed study, Schor carefully documents the significant and still
growing increase in the average number of hours worked by Americans along
with the concomitant reduction in real earnings.
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hourly wages of such workers declined by 10.2%.26 0 In 1993
dollars, average weekly earnings declined from $445.10 in 1973 to
$373.64 in 1993.261 If one were to graph the real spendable
hourly earnings of American workers in constant dollars from 1948
to the present, one would find a sharp and steady rise from 1948
until 1972. After that period, with one brief deviation, wages of
American workers have been in a steady and significant
decline.262 By 1994, "real spendable hourly earnings had fallen
back to below the level they had last reached in 1967. ,263 By
1994, the average full-time production employee, after taxes, took
home approximately $16,833.00, leaving very little margin above
the poverty line for a family of four.26
On an international scale, real hourly compensation in the
United States has fallen well behind Japan and most western
democracies. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in
1994, the United States ranked behind Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden in real hourly
261
compensation.
For the poorest workers, the wage squeeze has been even more
severe. Since the wages of the lowest paid workers are tied to the
minimum wage, erosion in the value of the minimum wage has a
particularly pronounced effect upon them. In 1994, "the real value
of the minimum wage . . . was lower than it was in 1950.,,266 A
full-time minimum wage worker in 1994 earned $4.25 per hour,
$170.00 per week or $8500.00 per year (excluding taxes, Federal
Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"), and other payroll deduc-
tions).267 If the full-time minimum wage worker had a
260 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 18 tbl.6.
261 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 18 tbl.6.
262 GORDON, supra note 178, at 19 fig.1.1.
263 GORDON, supra note 178, at 20.
264 GORDON, supra note 178, at 21.
265 GORDON, supra note 178, at 29.
266 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 2.7.
267 The minimum wage remained at $4.25 until the fall of 1996, when the
104th Congress enacted, and the president signed, legislation raising the
minimum wage as of October 1, 1996 to $4.75 per hour and as of September 1,
1997 to $5.15 per hour. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-188 § 2104, 110 Stat. 1755, 1928.
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child-precisely the situation in which an AFDC recipient who
finds work is most likely to be-her before-tax yearly income will
fall about $1500.00 short of the poverty line. It is important to
note, in this context, that minimum wage jobs are unlikely to afford
health insurance benefits to workers. 68
Some conservatives, Ben Wattenberg for example, maintain that
data on falling wages fail to take into account the rising value of
benefits such as health insurance.2 69 Several responses can be
made to that assertion. First, the number of jobs that provide
benefits has been falling steadily. In 1980, 97% of full-time
employees received some form of medical coverage, and 71% had
coverage wholly financed by employer contribution. By 1993, those
figures had fallen to 82% and 37%, respectively. ° In 1980, 87%
of full-time workers had retirement benefits. By 1993, the propor-
tion of full-time workers with retirement benefits had fallen to
78%.271
Second, if the value of benefits covered by employers is
included in the calculations, the decline in real wages is only
slightly less. Real spendable hourly earnings (after-tax) declined
7.8% (including benefits) as opposed to 8.6% (excluding bene-
fits). 272
Third, in a point analogous to that made about Medicaid
spending on poor people, money spent on health benefits, the most
expensive part of a worker's benefits package, does not go into the
pockets of the worker and her family. While the worker enjoys the
benefit of the medical care provided by her health insurance, the
payment for that care goes to doctors, radiologists, hospital
administrators, etc. To illustrate this point, imagine a worker who
has cancer and received $100,000.00 of chemotherapy covered by
268 Welfare to Work, supra note 221, at 1.
269 See, e.g., BEN WATTENBERG, VALUES MATTER MOST: How REPUBLI-
CANS OR DEMOCRATS OR A THIRD PARTY CAN WIN AND RENEW THE AMERICAN
WAY OF LIFE 78 (1995) (arguing that the declining economic condition of the
middle class is not as grave as the wage data represents because the unreported
health pension benefits represent an important part of middle-class income).
270 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 2.8.
271 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 2.8.
272 GORDON, supra note 178, at 31 tbl.l.A.
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her health insurance. What would be her reaction if Wattenberg
greeted her on the street and said, "Hey, I heard you made over
100 grand this year!"? In all likelihood she, and every other sane
person, would find Wattenberg's remark utterly bizarre.
The decline in wages has a particular effect on child poverty
because families with children have seen their wages deteriorate
most.273 For young families, particularly, the negative trend has
been even more pronounced. For families with children headed by
persons younger than thirty, the decline in median income (in 1990
dollars) between 1973 and 1990 was 32.1%.274 The drop was
worst for families with young children headed by single women,
27.2%. For families with young children headed by single men, the
decline in median income was about half that or 13.7%. Families
with children headed by married couples experienced a slightly
smaller but still quite significant decline in median income,
12.8%.275
For all races, median income declined for families with young
children. The most severe decline, however, was for Black, non-
Latino families, 48.3%. That figure compares with a decline of
22% for White families and 27.9% for Latino families. 6
The decline in earnings among families with young children is,
itself, an effect of a general decline in the earnings of young adults
who tend, disproportionately, to head families with young children.
Workers aged sixteen to twenty-four have generally experienced an
erosion in real earnings more severe than their older counterparts,
or the working population. Between 1973 and 1994, the inflation-
adjusted earnings of men under twenty-five who were employed
full-time fell by 31%.277 For women, who were similarly situated,
the decline in earnings was a smaller, but still significant, 14%.278
Median weekly earnings in 1993 dollars of sixteen- to twenty-four-
year-olds fell, for men, from $386.00 in 1967 (the first year the
273 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 59-60.
274 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 19 tbl.7.
275 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 19 tbl.7.
276 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 19 tbl.7.
277 Andrew M. Sum et al., The Economics of Despair, AM. PROSPECT, July-
Aug. 1996, at 83.
278 Id. at 83-84.
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Bureau of Labor Statistics began gathering such information) to
$286.00 in 1994. For women, aged sixteen to twenty-four, median
weekly earnings declined from $294.00 in 1967 to $271.00 in
1994.279 Among the effects of what some commentators have
called a lengthening of "economic adolescence" have been "a sharp
increase in the age of first marriages; . . . a rise in young single-
parent families; reduced economic support of children; ... [and]
the sustained rise in the numbers of young men incarcerated in jail
and prison."2 '
The falling income of young adults and families with young
children goes far toward explaining why young children experience
the highest rates of both poverty and deep poverty. By 1990, the
official poverty rate for children in families headed by someone
younger than thirty was 40%.8
Many reasons are offered to explain the decline in wages,
among them global competition and the anti-inflationary policies of
the Federal Reserve Board discussed above. Another likely factor
in suppressing wages was the decline in unionized labor in the
United States. As a percentage of all employees, the proportion of
unionized workers has sharply declined since 1954. In that year,
union workers represented 34% of all employees. By 1993, union
members constituted only 16% of all employees.8 2 Unions
remain strong among public sector employees, where union
members constitute nearly 37% of all employees.2 3 But among
private sector employees, union members dropped to 11.5% in
1992, and may drop to as low as 5% by the year 2000.284 In the
first Reagan administration alone, unions lost 2.7 million members,
largely because of job loss attributable to recessions in those
years.285
279 Id. at 84.
20 Id. at 84.
281 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 18.
282 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 2.15.
283 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 29.
284 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 29.
285 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 29. Ironically, Charles Murray, in the last of his
Harold and Phyllis thought experiments, has Harold get a union job that provides
him with a salary that, though "barely enough to go around. . . did go around."
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c. Income Inequality
The suffering caused by falling wages and rising unemployment
has not, however, been felt by all Americans. While the poorest
Americans (here defined as the lowest quintile in income), saw
their income fall by 10% between 1977 and 1989, for those at the
top of the economic pecking order the past two decades have been
a time of plenty. From 1977 to 1989, for example, the richest 1%
accounted for 60% of all after-tax income gains.286 Furthermore,
between 1983 and 1989 the richest 1% of Americans increased
their wealth (or share of net worth) from 31% to 37% of total
national wealth. 287 The richest 1% of Americans now own more
than the bottom 90%.288
Considering the distribution of income and net worth by
household, the top 20%, in 1991, owned 45% of all household
wealth, while the bottom 20% owned about 7%.289 The median
net worth of the top 20% ($123,166.00) is almost twenty-five times
that of the bottom 20% ($5224.00).29o As a share of the total
value of family-owned assets in 1989,
[t]he richest 1% of families held: 45% of all nonresidential
real estate, 62% of all business assets, 49% of all publicly
held stock, and 78% of all bonds. The richest 10% of
families held: 80% of all nonresidential real estate, 91% of
all business assets, 85% of all publicly held stock, and 94%
of all bonds.29'
Contributing to the widening gap between rich and poor was the
dramatic decrease, during the Reagan years, in the top tax rate from
90% to 3 1%,292 and the rising gap between the pay of an average
worker and that of a chief executive officer ("CEO"). After-tax
MURRAY, supra note 119, at 176.
286 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 7 fig.2.
287 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 1.2.
288 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 1.2.
289 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 1.1.
290 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 1.1.
291 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 1.4.
292 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 1.2.
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income for CEOs during the 1980s increased in inflation adjusted
terms by 66%. During the same period, production workers' real
hourly pay decreased by 7%.293
During the period when workers' wages have been falling,
executive compensation has skyrocketed. In 1960, the average CEO
earned in a year about forty times what the average factory worker
earned in a year. By 1993, the average CEO earned 149 times the
average annual income of a factory worker, or $3,772,000.00 for
the CEO to $25,317.00 for the factory worker.294 Executive
compensation in the United States is considerably higher than that
in other wealthy democracies. In Japan, for example, in 1992 the
average CEO earned in a year thirty-two times what the average
factory worker earned in a year.295
Partly due to those trends, the United States now has the
highest differential in yearly incomes between rich and poor
families. In the United States, low-income families earn an average
of $10,923.00 per year, while high income families earn an average
of $65,536.00. Sweden, by contrast, has an average income for
low-income families of $18,129.00, and an average income for
high-income families of $46,152.00.296 Sweden also has a rate of
child poverty less than one-tenth that of the United States.297
Income inequality, whatever its other ill-effects on democracy,
also seems to be strongly correlated with child poverty. That is to
say, societies with greater levels of income inequality also have
greater levels of child poverty. A comparison of rankings for child
poverty rates and family income inequality reveals that correlation.
Table 4 provides a 1992 ranking of eight western nations by child
poverty (most to least) and family income inequality (most to
least). Note that the United States has the highest level of income
inequality and the highest level of child poverty.
293 GORDON, supra note 178, at 34.
294 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 1.6.
295 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 1.6.
296 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 148 tb.5-1.
297 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 149.
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Table 4. 1992
Ineaualitv:298
Rankings by Child Poverty and Family Income
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the vast majority of
workers in the United States have seen the value of their earnings
decline, scope of health and retirement benefits decrease, opportu-
nities for full-time employment grow more scarce, and inequality
of wealth between the rich and everyone else increase dramatically.
All those economic trends have had the effect of pushing more and
more families into poverty and, with those families, the children
who belong to them. As the data reveal, young families have
suffered most in the past twenty years from the three economic
trends discussed above. It is those families that tend to have young
children, precisely the group for whom poverty and deep poverty
rates have increased most dramatically.
2. Government Policies
The basic contention of the progressive position about govern-
ment poor relief programs is that they provide too little aid and
298 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 148 tbl.5-1, 149 tbl.5-2.
Ranking Ranking
Nation In In
Child Poverty Family Income
Rate Inequality
United States 1 1
Canada 2 2
Australia 3 3
United Kingdom 4 5
France 5 6
Netherlands 6 7
Germany 7 4
Sweden 8 8
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only after too many obstacles have been overcome. In order to
explain that contention, it is helpful to say something about the
history of poor relief for children in this country.
Poor children, especially those who live on the streets, have
been recognized as a social problem for centuries. In 1849, for
example, the New York City Chief of Police complained in a report
of the "incredible" and "constantly increasing numbers of vagrant,
idle and vicious children."2 99 The journalist Jacob Riis made these
children the subject of his now famous work. Those children
struggled to survive through a combination of day-labor (e.g.,
"flower-girls" and "newsies"), street crime, and prostitution. Until
the beginning of the nineteenth century, child prostitution was a
major social problem in America's cities. The favored method of
dealing with such children, from at least the end of the eighteenth
century up until the mid-twentieth century,300 was some form of
"indoor" relief. 3
01
Poor relief in western societies has traditionally been divided
into two broad categories: indoor and outdoor relief 302 Indoor
relief is roughly synonymous with institutionalization: putative
assistance offered in centralized, supervised settings. Outdoor relief
is either in-kind or cash assistance provided to poor people in their
homes. The AFDC program is an example of outdoor relief:
assistance is provided to poor families and their dependent children
by providing monthly benefits, at home, to the adult care-taker of
the children.30 3
As Dickens detailed in his novels, early institutions of poor
relief, particularly those for children, were marked by the most
appalling conditions of cruelty and deprivation. The punitive
character of institutions for poor relief was, by no means, acci-
dental. As the English Poor Law Commissioners wrote in 1834:
299 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 68, at 145.
300 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 68, at 146-47.
30 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 142, at 54.
302 For a discussion of the history of outdoor and indoor poor relief,
particularly as it pertains to the United States, see HANDLER, supra note 30, at
10-31.
303 See generally HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 142, at 44-81
(discussing the development of AFDC to its present form).
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Into such a house none will enter voluntarily; work,
confinement, and discipline, will deter the indolent and
vicious; and nothing but extreme necessity will induce any
to accept the comfort which must be obtained by the
surrender of their free agency, and the sacrifice of their
accustomed habits and gratifications. Thus the parish
officer, being furnished an unerring test of the necessity of
applicants, is relieved from his painful and difficult respon-
sibility; while all have the gratification of knowing that
while the necessitous are abundantly relieved, the funds of
charity are not wasted by idleness and fraud.3 4
The logic of His Majesty's Commissioners was functionally
indistinguishable from that of adherents to the conservative position
today: poor relief should be so meager and its conditions so harshly
onerous that only those in the most dire need will submit to accept
it, thus deterring indolence and encouraging self-reliance and the
work ethic. Since, prior to the child labor laws of the mid-twentieth
century, children represented an important part of the labor supply
in western capitalist societies, it was important that any relief
arrangements for them should not encourage "idleness." The
deplorable conditions of the workhouse, then, served a dual
function with regard to child poverty: (1) they screened undeserv-
ing applicants by making conditions so horrible that only the most
desperately needy would have recourse to them; and (2) they
guaranteed that children would be socialized into an expanding
proletarian workforce or, as an English statute of 1576 put it,
"youth may be accustomed and brought up in labor and work," by
demanding of the adult and child residents of workhouses an
intense daily regime of manual labor.3"5
Gradually, a somewhat less punitive approach to child poverty
emerged in western societies. By the middle of the nineteenth
century, children and childhood were beginning to be regarded as
particularly vulnerable and in need of protection. That spirit is
illustrated by the English reformer Mary Carpenter who, in the
1850s, wrote that the best cure for juvenile criminal offenders was
304 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 8, at 33-34.
305 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 8, at 24.
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love, for only love could restore to the juvenile offender "the
nature of the child, as a child.,
30 6
In the United States, relief institutions for children spread
dramatically from the 1830s through the post-Civil War period.
By 1850 in New York State alone there were twenty-seven
public and private institutions caring for children. In the
country as a whole, the seventy-seven private orphanages
of 1851 had increased to 613 by 1880, and there were a
further 474 established over the following twenty years. By
1910 there were over 150,000 dependent, neglected and
delinquent children cared for in 1,151 institutions. 30 7
By today's standards, those numbers do not seem quite impressive.
By the standards of the period, however, they marked a significant
shift in both attitudes toward and methods for dealing with children
in need. Moreover, the term "orphanage" may be misleading in this
context. Many of the children resident in these institutions were not
orphans in the strict sense of the word-having no living parent or
parent whose whereabouts were known. A study of the clientele of
four orphanages in one mid-western state, for example, revealed
that two-thirds of the children resident in those orphanages had two
living parents.308 It is reasonable to surmise, therefore, that a
significant number of nineteenth century "orphans" were actually
children from destitute families.
At the time of the passage of the Social Security Act of
1935,309 many of the institutions by which assistance was pro-
vided to poor children had come under severe criticism.
Social Security, unemployment insurance, and AFDC were
responses to the magnitude of poverty and suffering caused by the
306 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 68, at 146 (quoting Mary Carpenter) (emphasis
omitted).
307 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 68, at 147.
308 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 68, at 147.
309 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1935). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-403, 405,422-423,
425, 902-903, 1320b-15, 1382, 1382c, 1383, 1383c, 1383e (1996) (enumerating
the provisions for the 1996 amendment). In August 1996, the Congress passed
and the president signed legislation abolishing the AFDC program, radically
changing the nature of poor relief in the United States and ending the federal
guarantee of food and cash assistance to poor children.
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Great Depression. The federal legislation that created those
programs was also a response to the disorganization and inadequacy
of the confused patchwork of poor relief programs maintained by
the several states. The legislation contained three main relief provi-
sions: (1) unemployment insurance financed by a federal payroll
tax, but administered by the states; (2) old-age insurance, also
financed by federal wage and payroll taxes, to be paid to eligible
persons, on a monthly basis, beginning at age sixty-five; and (3) a
program of federal aid to states that chose to provide relief to
various "unemployable" persons, particularly the elderly not eligible
for the new old-age insurance, the blind, and the orphaned.310 It
was out of the third element of the Social Security Act that the
AFDC program emerged.
It is important to acknowledge, however, that prior to the Social
Security Act of 1935, almost all states had some form of Aid to
Dependent Children ("ADC") or "mothers' pensions" program."'
While these programs did not require all mothers to work, indeed
the programs were predicated upon the idea that the mother-
beneficiary could stay home and care for her children, it would be
wrong to see state ADC programs as embracing mothers with
dependent children as among the "deserving poor."'3 12 There were
a number of conditions imposed upon recipients, among them the
requirement that a mother be "fit and proper., 313 In most jurisdic-
tions, ADC mothers were subject to work requirements, and could
be made to work if officials administering the program deemed it
SO.
3 14
When the Social Security Act of 1935 created a federal ADC
program, it left the states with almost total responsibility for
administering that program. Indeed, as Joel Handler has pointed
out, it would be more accurate to see the ADC program created by
the Social Security Act of 1935 as a "grant in aid" program
to the states for a circumscribed class of women with
310 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 8, at 92.
311 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 23.
312 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 24.
313 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 24.
314 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 25.
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dependent children.315 For the first three decades of its existence,
the primary beneficiaries of the federal ADC program were White
widows and their children.3 16
In the 1960s, important changes occurred in the federal ADC
program. First, in 1962 the program was amended to expand
significantly its scope.317 In other legislative acts that had a
dramatic effect on poor relief in this country, in 1965 Congress
established the Medicaid program, a system of health insurance for
indigent people. Five years later, Congress created the federal Food
Stamp program and imposed upon the states a minimum benefit
level.318
Second, a series of court decisions helped remove some of the
most egregiously discriminatory barriers to access to the AFDC
program. From its inception, the AFDC program, like its state
predecessors, had been plagued by barriers to access based upon
invidious characteristics such as race. Moreover, state administra-
tors frequently ignored even the most basic due process guarantees
in denying or terminating benefits. In decisions like King v
Smith,3' 9 Shapiro v Thompson,32 ° and Goldberg v Kelly,3 21
the Supreme Court significantly widened the ability of eligible poor
women and their children to gain access to assistance through the
AFDC program. Those decisions had a particularly significant
effect on Black women and children who had, through racial
discrimination, been disproportionately excluded from the assistance
of the AFDC program.322
315 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 28.
316 HANDLER, supra note 30, at 28.
317 Laurence C. Nolan, The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and
Mandating Norplant for Women on Welfare Discourse, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER &
LAW 15, 18 (1994).
318 JENCKS, supra note 47, at 9.
319 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (striking down Alabama "man in the house" rule,
disqualifying from AFDC benefits any woman who cohabited with a man other
than her husband).
320 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down requirement that AFDC recipient be
resident in jurisdiction for certain length of time prior to application).
321 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (recognizing property interest in welfare benefits
and holding that interest to be protected by procedural due process guarantees).
322 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 8, at 193-94.
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For these and other reasons,32 3 the number of AFDC recipi-
ents grew from about one million in 1940, to two million in 1950,
to three million in 1960, to nine million in 1970, to eleven million
in 1975. The number of AFDC recipients has remained relatively
constant since that time, with children constituting two-thirds of the
recipients.3 2
4
The first point to be made about the AFDC program is that,
however much the number of recipients grew in the 1960s and
1970s, the AFDC program has never assisted all eligible children
and their families. So, for example, in 1992, when the child
poverty rate was 22%, approximately 14.6 million children lived in
poverty. Yet only 9.2 million children lived in families that
received AFDC benefits.3 25 Thus 37% of the children living in
families with incomes beneath the official poverty line were not
receiving assistance from the AFDC program.
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, AFDC benefits, even
when combined with food stamps and other forms of assistance
(including housing), do not raise a family above the poverty line.
It is hard for most Americans to grasp how meager AFDC benefits
truly are.
AFDC benefits vary widely throughout the country. In
Tennessee, for example, a family of three receives $183.00 per
month in AFDC benefits.326 In Alabama, the amount is even
lower, $115.00 per month.327 In New York, which has one of the
highest AFDC payment schedules, a family of three receives
$291.00.00 per month for food and other expenses. An eligible
family can receive another $286.00 in shelter assistance. If a family
is able to gain access to both, the total monthly budget for an
323 There has been extensive discussion of what caused the rise in AFDC
roles in the 1960s and early 1970s. For examples of such discussions, see
HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 142, at 113-31; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra
note 8, at 196. Not least among the reasons for the growth in the number of
families gaining assistance from AFDC was a growing welfare rights movement,
by which poor people asserted their moral right to assistance from the side-
effects of an economy that enriches some and reduces many to misery.
324 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 142, at 113.
325 Handler, supra note 215, at 8.
326 TENNESSEE STUDY, supra note 224, at x.
327 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 6.9 (reporting 1990 statistics).
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AFDC family of three in New York City is $577.00 or $6924.00
a year. The official poverty line for a family of three in 1995 was
$12,590.00.328 Thus an AFDC family of three in New York City
would receive a household income equal to about 54% of the
poverty line or just above what the Census Bureau considers "deep
poverty."
Across the nation, the average monthly AFDC payment per
family has dropped from about $620.00 in 1972 to about $375.00
today.3 29 Even when food stamps are included with AFDC, the
combined median benefits are only 72% of the poverty line.33° In
dollar terms, in 1992 the average AFDC benefit per recipient was
$136.00 per month. Food stamps contributed another $68.50 per
month, bringing the total to $204.50 per month.33'
Consider raising a child on $54.12 a week and the reason so
many children are poor in this country becomes less difficult to
understand. In fact, a General Accounting Office ("GAO") study of
poverty trends between 1980 and 1988 found that a decreasingly
smaller percentage of poor families headed by single parents were
lifted out of poverty by the benefits of federal poor relief pro-
grams.
332
In 1979 approximately 30 percent of individuals in single-
parent families were removed from poverty as the result of
means-tested transfers, food and housing benefits, and
Federal tax policy. By 1990, this had declined to 20
percent.333
The report concluded that "the primary reason for the apparent
poverty rate increase among women heading single-parent families
living alone is the decrease in [AFDC and other] transfer pay-
ments.
334
The inadequacy of AFDC and other poor relief payments to lift
families and their children out of poverty is exacerbated by the
32 See supra Part I tbl. 1.
329 BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra at note 21, at 160 fig.5-8.
330 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 95.
33 ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 16.
332 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 95.
333 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 95.
334 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 95.
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obstacles that are put in the way of poor families in gaining access
to those admittedly meager benefits. At this point, it seems
appropriate to digress into first person narrative, if only very
briefly.
As an attorney working with poor youth, primarily gay and
lesbian youth some of whom are homeless because of parental
rejection, I can attest personally to the intimidating maze of hostile
bureaucracy and incomprehensible formalities that stand between
a poor person and the receipt of AFDC, general relief, food stamps,
Medicaid or shelter assistance. The agency with which I work, the
Urban Justice Center, through its outreach to homeless families and
individuals, gay and lesbian street youth, indigent consumers of
mental health services, and women and children who are victims of
domestic violence, deals on a daily basis with the public assistance
system in New York. Besides undertaking impact litigation, each
year the Urban Justice Center handles literally thousands of cases
of people who have been unfairly denied or terminated from public
assistance benefits.
From more than thirteen years of experience, advocates at the
Urban Justice Center can attest to the myriad ways in which
deserving people are denied desperately needed assistance. What is
almost totally ignored, in contemporary discussion of programs
such as "workfare" or "learnfare" or any other of the dozens of
conditions that have been or will be placed upon the receipt of
public assistance, is that all of those conditions have the same
penalty: termination or reduction of benefits. Thus, to use New
York City for example, the Work Experience Program ("WEP")
(New York City's equivalent of workfare) demands that recipients
make various appointments for evaluation, assignment to a
worksite, and then report to the worksite itself. There are recertific-
ations for food stamps and AFDC. There are home visits and spot
checks the putative purpose of which is to prevent fraud, but
instead result in massive invasions of privacy as public assistance
workers talk to neighbors, landlords, and sometimes perfect
strangers about a recipient's status as a public assistance benefici-
ary. There are demands for all sorts of documents in the application
process, and then a completely redundant set of demands for
Eligibility Verification Review or ("EVR"). EVR is a process that
gathers no new information, contributes nothing substantive to the
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determination of eligibility, but serves purely and simply as another
obstacle to prevent poor people from obtaining what paltry
assistance our society affords them.
At any point in the process a misdirected notice, a computer
error, a bureaucratic blunder, a health crisis that causes an
appointment to be missed without notice, a negligent caseworker or
any of a score of other factors can cause a case to be closed. The
only resort is to apply for a state fair hearing, a process that often
takes months to resolve, or to find an advocacy organization that
will attempt to resolve the matter in the recipient's favor. Many
public assistance recipients, however, lack the skills, the knowledge
or the good luck to navigate the process successfully or to find free
legal assistance when they have come upon the shoals of a system
of poor relief designed to be as parsimonious as it is punitive.
In a study of 2540 of its clients over an eight-month period in
1990, the Urban Justice Center found that fully 50% of those who
received referrals to income maintenance centers ("welfare" centers
in New York City) either never completed the applications process,
or had their cases closed shortly after referral. 335 Fully three-
quarters of the clients in the study who began receiving public
assistance before July 1, 1990, had their benefits terminated, for
one reason or another, by the end of the year.336 While it is true
that almost all of the clients who turn to the Urban Justice Center
for assistance have their cases reopened either through administra-
tive advocacy or through successful state fair hearings, the fact
remains that thousands of people who are either denied benefits or
have their public assistance cases closed never find legal assistance.
The findings of the Urban Justice Center are given support by
data on the use of various forms of poor relief by people under the
poverty line in the United States. In 1992, less than half of the
people officially defined as poor received any form of cash
assistance.337 Slightly more than half received food stamps or
13' LEGAL ACTION CENTER FOR THE HOMELESS, LONG DAY'S JOURNEY
INTO NIGHT: TRACKING APPLICANTS THROUGH THE ENTITLEMENTS MAZE 8
(1993).
336 Id. at 2.
33' ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 17, at 17.
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medical insurance through Medicaid.338 In 1973, child bene-
ficiaries of AFDC constituted 81% of the total number of children
in families with incomes under the poverty line. By 1992, children
benefitting from the AFDC program made up only 63% of the total
number of children living in families with incomes under the
poverty line.3 39 "The number of all AFDC recipients as a percent
of the pre-welfare official poverty population dropped from 55
percent in 1979 to 49 percent in 1991. "34
Despite conservative rhetoric that depicts poor relief programs
in the United States as both generous and indiscriminate in
awarding benefits, in fact, the so-called safety net in this country
is both tattered and shrinking. In 1992, only 43% of poor people
who lived in households participating in federal poor relief
programs received any kind of means-tested cash assistance. Only
56% of such persons lived in households where one or more people
was covered by Medicaid. Furthermore, only 18% of such persons
lived in households that received some form of public or subsidized
housing.34'
The conclusion of the progressive position is that the problem
of poverty in the United States does not require recourse to theories
of a lazy, promiscuous, and violent underclass. Psychological
problems and moral failures plague all human beings, regardless of
class, race or other personal attribute. The progressive position
maintains that an economy that fails, on a greater and greater level,
to provide an adequate number of decent jobs at decent wages;
along with a system of poor relief that provides far too little, and
only after far too many obstacles have been overcome; are, if not
the whole answer, at least the greater part of the answer to the
problem of poverty in the United States, a problem of which child
poverty is arguably the most tragic aspect.
338 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 94.
339 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 94.
340 SKLAR, supra note 22, at 94.
34 FOLBRE, supra note 72, at 6.8.
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CONCLUSION
The next subject to discuss is style; for it is not enough to
have a supply of things to say, but it is also necessary to
say it in the right way, and this contributes much toward
the speech seeming to have a certain quality.
-Aristotle
42
In the introduction to the tenth anniversary edition of Losing
Ground, Charles Murray recounts how what was, in his opinion,
the best title for the book was suggested by a friend: Fucking Over
the Poor. The Missionary Position.343 Murray explains that
although he thought the title "perfect" because it "encapsulate[d]
the narrative and thesis of the entire book in seven words," he
rejected it because he "just couldn't see [him]self proposing it to
the folks at Basic Books (the publishers of the original edi-
tion). 344 One has to wonder if, apart from Murray's perception
of his publisher's prudery, he also worried that the more prosaic
title suggested by his friend would invite a more accurate interpre-
tation of the substance and effect of the book's policy prescriptions
for poor people.
The question is not rhetorical, or rather it is rhetorical in the
most literal sense of the term. That is to say, there is something
significant and revealing about the fact that Murray rejected a title
for his book that, though descriptively accurate was perceived to be
rhetorically deficient, perhaps because it allowed an interpretation
of the book that Murray found dangerously unacceptable. The
significance of the point is magnified in the light of its context, for
although Losing Ground is an important book for the fact that it
proposed eliminating the federal system of poor relief entirely
345
and had an enormous influence on contemporary conservative
342 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF Civic DISCOURSE 1404a
(George A. Kennedy trans., 1991). Kennedy leaves the Greek lexis which in the
quotation has been translated as "style."
343 MURRAY, supra at note 119, at xiii.
344 MURRAY, supra at note 119, at xiv.
345 MURRAY, supra note 119, at 227.
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policy makers, Losing Ground is also, perhaps equally, important
for the style it employed.
Murray's distinctive contribution to the contemporary conserva-
tive rhetorical arsenal, a contribution still not sufficiently appreci-
ated, was that he did not employ a tone of admonishment and
condemnation of the poor. Rather, Murray couched the shocking
brutality and vicious implications of his arguments in the most
benign prose. Depriving poor families of the meager allotment of
food and money they received through AFDC was thus presented
as an exercise in compassion.34 6 Critics noted the same of
Murray's 1994 book, The Bell Curve,347 which assumed a tone of
troubled and tentative perplexity about what Murray alleges are
race differences in intelligence, all the while arguing the thesis that
race significantly determines intelligence, with Whites superior in
intelligence to Blacks.348
Murray's rhetorical tactic is by no means original. Nevertheless,
the scope and effectiveness of its adoption by conservative
advocates of the abolition of poor relief testifies to its importance
as a tool of political presentation and persuasion. The problem with
this strategy, however, is that it is extraordinarily vulnerable to the
facts. That is to say, if a political figure makes compassion for the
poor a hallmark of his or her rhetoric, it is highly likely that, when
confronted by the real suffering of poor people, the public may
expect him or her actually to demonstrate compassion. The problem
is all the more intense when those who suffer are, for whatever
reasons, particularly sympathetic to the public.
Therein lies the problem of child poverty for the conservative
position: poor children are exceptionally resistant, from both a
logical and emotional standpoint, to the major rhetorical strategies
346 Accordingly, we may assume that the agent of the verb in Murray's
rejected title was the federal government and progressives who support poor
relief programs; not conservatives like Murray who want to abolish such
programs to "save" poor people from themselves.
147 See generally RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994)
(alleging correlation between ethnicity, intelligence, and economic achievement).
348 See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Subject to Debate: The Republican Party and
Unwed Mothers, NATION, Dec. 12, 1994, at 717.
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with which the conservative position has waged its highly success-
ful assault on poor relief in the United States. To understand that
point, it is necessary to consider the most fundamental premise of
the conservative position; the chief rhetorical strategies employed
to defend that premise; and the specific ways in which poor
children fail to be susceptible to those strategies. Prior to consid-
ering those points, however, something must be said about the
method of the rhetorical analysis undertaken here.
A. A Method of Rhetorical Analysis
The assumption, what some might call the naively optimistic
assumption, behind this mode of rhetorical analysis is that raw
appeals to emotion have extremely limited utility, and diminish in
effectiveness over time. Over the long haul, successful rhetoric,
especially as in this context rhetoric deployed in the public
disputations of politics, must combine as Aristotle saw facts, style,
and delivery.349 The last of those reconceived for the corrupt
audiences of the electronic age as including all the aspects of
audio-visual presentation through the mass media. Based on that
assumption, it can be inferred that rhetoric, understood most
broadly as persuasive speech, in order to be effective must respect
the constraints of logic and experience, while simultaneously
engaging the passions. The exposure of factual errors or faulty
reasoning will, over time, prove fatal to even the most emotionally
appealing pieces of oratory.
Thus, independent of whether the speaker means what she says,
she nevertheless experiences certain logical and empirical con-
straints on the sorts of arguments she can effectively deploy in
defense of her position. Additionally, given that persuasive speech
invariably involves an appeal to the passions, the argument must be
presented in a manner that engages the sympathy of the audience.
With regard to the debate about poverty and poor relief in the
United States, some have argued that the fuel that powers the
engine of conservative rhetoric is hate and fear; especially of
349 ARISTOTLE, supra note 342, at 1404a.
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Blacks, other racial minorities, and women.35° That there is much
truth to that point cannot be denied. Indeed, it may well be that the
larger part of the success of conservative rhetoric over welfare is
due to animosity toward people of color and women, both of whom
are over-represented among the poor and people on AFDC.
Nevertheless, that is not the approach of this analysis. Rather,
for the purposes of this analysis, the relevant consideration is the
rhetoric that is actually deployed by the adherents of the conserva-
tive position. In that rhetoric, overt appeals to racism or sexism are
rare, though not nonexistent.
Early in the debate in the 104th Congress over dismantling the
present system of poor relief, the rhetoric of conservatives tended
to be harsh and accusatory, derogating recipients of AFDC as
"alligators" and "wolves., 35' Not long after, polls showed a drop
in the approval ratings of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, largely
attributable to public perception of his "style." '352 In what may
have been a conscious change of rhetorical strategy, in the second
session of the 104th Congress the rhetoric of Gingrich and House
Republicans on poor people and welfare softened considerably.
Like Murray, House Republicans tended to speak of the poor as
victims of an uncaring welfare state, driven into all sorts of anti-
social behavior by the misguided charity of the federal government.
350 For an analysis of racism and sexism in the debate over changes in public
assistance in the United States, see, for example, Lucy White, The Ideology of
Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719
(1992); Andrew Hacker, The Crackdown on African-Americans, NATION, July 10,
1995, at 45; see also GANS supra note 235, which can be viewed as an
elaboration of this basic point. While not focusing exclusively on racism or
misogyny, Gans nonetheless sees the poor as screens onto which the nonpoor
project anxieties and animus. The poor are scapegoats for a host of societal ills.
Accordingly, for Gans, changing terminology-redefining the poor out of the
"underclass"-moves poor people out of the focus of societal hatred and
aggression, and creates the possibility of constructing a rational system of poor
relief.
31 Robert Pear, House Approves Shift on Welfare, N.Y. TIMEs, July 19,
1996, at A l.
352 Michael Wines, Public Gives Congress Good Marks, But Is Mixed on
Gingrich, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1995, at A22.
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Similarly, poor children were cast as the most tragic casualties of
the "War on Poverty." '353
In its successful drive to eliminate the sixty-year-old guarantee
of basic cash and nutritional assistance to poor children and their
parents, the dominant rhetorical technique of the conservative
position has been to move public passion by appeal to those values
that people believe themselves to hold dear: responsibility, self-
reliance, industriousness, compassion, and fair-play. Rather than
maintaining that altruistic rhetoric is merely cover for racist, classist
or misogynist animus-an entirely plausible position to take-this
analysis treats advocates of the conservative position as meaning
what they say and saying what they mean. Thus when Representa-
tive E. Clay Shaw (R-Fla.), one of the primary authors of the
Personal Responsibility Act of 1995... (the original House
Republican legislation to end the federal guarantee of assistance to
poor children and their parents), assures the public that neither he
nor the conservative House leadership would "put up with thou-
sands of children going into foster care or with people starv-
ing," '355 he will be taken at his word. Consequently, when thou-
sands of children are homeless and hungry, the presumption will be
that Representative Shaw's argument has a problem: he must either
devise a new justification for his position; explain the challenging
phenomenon of neglected children in a manner that does not
conflict with the basic premises of his position; or, as a last resort,
surrender his position.
Accordingly, in analyzing the conservative response to the
phenomenon of child poverty, the question that will be asked is:
What implications does the existence of poor children have for the
basic premises of the conservative position; and what are the ways
in which child poverty would have to be understood and addressed
in order not to upset those premises?
"' Charles Krauthammer, GOP Will Lose Election Due to Lack of
Gumption, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 1996, at 17 (arguing that the Republican Party
has softened its stance on the welfare state in response to the public).
314 H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996).
"' Iowa Plan Tries to Cut Off the Cash, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1995, at Al
(quoting the remarks of Representative E. Clay Shaw Jr.) [hereinafter Iowa
Plan].
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B. Basic Premises
The basic premise of the conservative position on poor relief,
a premise shared by contemporary conservatives despite differences
on issues like reproductive rights, is that capitalism, here treated as
synonymous with the "market" economy, is best suited for
providing the material basis of a democratic society. While the
market generates some level of suffering due to impoverishment,
that level of suffering is not sufficiently great to be either morally
intolerable or politically destabilizing to a democratic society.
Government intervention to ameliorate or eliminate poverty
invariably interferes with the basic operation of the market and, if
only in its unintended consequences, does more harm than good.
The market, by contrast, is good because it is efficient and, in
the long run, fair. In its ability to provide incentives to work and
invest, stimulate innovation, create wealth, bring about a happy
congruence between what is desired and what is produced, the
market is unsurpassed and unsurpassable. While it can be harsh and
seemingly capricious in its short term operation, in the long term
the market's extraordinary ability to create wealth redounds to the
benefit of all society. The market is the sea whose rising tide lifts
all boats.
For that reason, capitalism is ultimately the most rational
economic system, more rational in the way it is suited to human
nature and in the material betterment of humankind it generates
than any planned economy. On this view, one of the great ironies
of history is that advocates of planned economies, in their attempts
to "rationalize" economic activity, were engaging in a most
irrational enterprise. The laws of supply and demand that govern
the market are to human nature in a situation of scarce resources
what Sir Isaac Newton's laws are to moving bodies. Endeavors to
construct an economic system that ignore or reject those laws,
Socialism being the chief historical example of such quixotic
efforts, are as sure to fail as endeavors to construct a skyscraper
that ignore the laws of physics.
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At its most extreme, the position described above would oppose
any state intervention in the market. 56 Political reality makes it
unlikely that someone who holds such an extreme position will
hold public office for long. In practice, adherents of the conserva-
tive position exhibit their preference for the laissez-faire ideal by
relentless opposition to government regulation of or intervention in
the market. Failures of the market, particularly those recurrent,
systemic failures that seem to be a non-incidental product of the
structure of the market itself, i.e., "market pathologies," constitute,
therefore, a serious and ongoing problem for the conservative
position. Such failures, besides providing compelling reasons for
state intervention in the market, undermine the basic premise of the
conservative position about the efficiency and benevolence of the
market economy.
C. Rhetorical Strategies
The persistence of a significant level of poverty is one of the
most challenging phenomena with which defenders of the market
must deal. When the numbers of people in poverty is increasing,
and the misery due to that poverty is particularly intense, the
political problem of defenders of the market is greatly magnified.
If to the sheer scope and intensity of poverty is added particularly
sympathetic attributes of those who are poor, for example, the
small bodies, innocent faces, and guileless characters of children,
the crisis in legitimacy for the market becomes especially acute
and, therefore, the rationale for state intervention becomes
practically irrebuttable.
For the defender of the market the problem can be stated
simply: if the poor are innocent or "deserving" then the market is
failing in both efficiency and fairness. In other words, if the poor
are innocent, the market must be guilty of their impoverishment.
356 While market intervention by the state is the primary focus of conserva-
tive criticism, there is no principled reason why conservative defenders of the
market should not object to intervention in the market by agents other than the
state. If monetary assistance to able-bodied, unemployed adults does, in fact,
cause indolence and illegitimacy, that effect should be the same whether the
source of the funds is the state, a church or an individual.
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The poor are capitalism's problem children: they do not behave,
they will not be silent, they cannot go away. The poor, then, are
living evidence of a fundamental defect at the heart of the market.
By their very existence the poor have, to use Herbert Marcuse's
term, a "deligitimating" effect on the political economy of capital-
ism.
It follows, then, that if the market is to retain its moral
legitimacy, the poor cannot be regarded as innocent. Either through
their own faults-indolence, promiscuity, inability to delay
gratification, stupidity--or because of the anti-social behavior
encouraged in the poor by misguided government charity, the poor
must be seen as the primary agents of their own impoverishment.
That, of course, is nothing more than a summary of the central
thesis and motivating spirit of the works considered in the
preceding discussion: Murray, Rector, Olasky, Gingrich, House Bill
4, and the recently passed House Bill 3734357 that abolished the
six-decade-old federal guarantee of a basic level of cash and
nutritional assistance to poor children and their families.
Herbert Gans, in his The War Against the Poor, argues that the
need to depict the poor as somehow culpable for their own poverty,
as undeserving, is not unique to capitalism.35 Noting that the
poor have been depicted as undeserving for nearly five centuries,
Gans concludes that the presence of the poor is always a threat to
the better off, and "judging some poor people as undeserving has
positive uses or benefits for various institutions and interest groups
in society., 35
9
Surely Gans is right to contend that any society marked by
significant inequalities of wealth will need to fashion an ideological
response to the problem of poverty.360 The have-nots will always
present a problem for the haves, if only for the fact that the latter
possess something that the former desire yet do not possess. Gans
goes too far, however, in understating the way in which particular
117 H.R. 3734, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (enacted) (repealing the 60-year
federal guarantee of assistance to poor children and their parents).
35" GANS, supra note 235, at 75.
"9 GANS, supra note 235, at 75.
360 See generally GANS, supra note 235, at 103-32 (suggesting components
of anti-poverty policy).
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economic arrangements, and the sorts of inequality they generate,
will determine the particular forms of blaming the poor: i.e., the
special ways in which the poor are depicted as undeserving.36 As
explained above, the poor represent a specific indictment of the
market economy in which they exist, and the sorts of theories that
are generated to explain the poor in their poverty will be forced to
meet the specific legitimation needs of a market economy.
For much of Western history, the ideological responses of the
dominant and propertied classes to the existence of both inequalities
of wealth and vast numbers of poor people did not rely upon
depicting the poor as the immoral agents of their own impoverish-
ment. Those responses, theological in character, used elaborate
metaphysical systems, along with significant amounts of popular
piety, to offer an explanation, apparently a rather effective
explanation, to account for the small numbers of haves and large
numbers of have-nots in society. Since they did not require it, these
explanations of the poverty of the poor did not posit character
flaws such as indolence or concupiscence in the poor. Rather, a
combination of fatalistic theology (one's economic and social
station as the effect of God's will for one's life) and the promise
of consolation in the afterlife (the reward of the poor in heaven as
in the story of Dives and Lazarus) provided a reasonably effective
response to theoretical challenges to the status quo.362
Even for the defender of a capitalist or emerging capitalist
economy, the sorts of arguments used to explain the existence of
36' GANS, supra note 235, at 76-77.
362 A contemporary illustration of this point is the theology of liberation, a
progressive form of Roman Catholic Christianity that drew heavily from the
writings of Marx. Originating in Latin America during the late 1960s, within a
society that, though part of a larger capitalist economy was nevertheless still
significantly agrarian and for many practical considerations feudal, the theology
of liberation initially took as its chief theoretical opponent the sort of fatalistic
and other-worldly theology described in the text. See generally GUSTAVO
GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION (Caridad Inda & John Eagleson trans.,
1973) (reflecting upon the experience and meaning of the faith based on the
commitment to abolish injustice and to build a new society); JUAN Luis
SEGUNDO, THE LIBERATION OF THEOLOGY (John Drury trans., 4th ed. 1976)
(offering a critique of Latin American theology through an examination of its
methodology, its premises, and its fidelity to biblical text).
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the poor, while defending the goodness of the market, will change
depending upon the other interests that are also being defended.
John Bird Sumner (1780-1862), for example, was an ardent
defender of a laissez-faire economy and a strong supporter of the
Poor Law Reform Act of 1834. Sumner was also an Anglican cleric
and Archbishop of Canterbury. 3
63
Sumner, in many ways, can be seen as an ideological and
rhetorical bridge between the medieval explanation of why the poor
are poor and the modem approach of blaming the poor for their
poverty. In trying to explain the existence of so many poor people
in his society, while still defending the goodness of the market
economy, Sumner argued that God had created human beings to
learn to live with the problem of growing population, unlimited
wants, and scarce resources.3 64 While it is true that Sumner
believed that ignorance or lack of education was the primary reason
that poor people were poor, his defense of the market relied even
more strongly on the divine purpose, for the betterment of
humanity, that Sumner discerned in the market's workings.365
The essence of a market economy, for Sumner, was a principle
whose operation
fill[s] the world with competitors for support, enforces
labour and encourages industry, by the advantages it gives
to the industrious and laborious at the expense of the
indolent and extravagant. The ultimate effect of it is, to
foster those arts and improvements which most dignify the
character and refine the mind of man; and lastly, to place
mankind in that situation which best enables them to
improve their natural faculties, and at the same time best
exercises, and most clearly displays, their virtues.366
Contemporary conservatives, unlike Sumner, confront a more
pluralistic, more secularized society. Explanations of why the poor
363 John Bird Sumner, Introduction to Reconciling Inequality and God's
Purposes in the Free Market, in CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS: A READER 333, 333
(John Atherton ed., 1994). For some discussion of the Poor Law Reform Act of
1834, see PIvEN & CLOWARD, supra note 8, at 33-41.
36 Sumner, supra note 363, at 335-36.
365 Sumner, supra note 363, at 344-45.
366 Sumner, supra note 363, at 341-42.
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are poor that rely on accepting the idea that God created capitalism
are unlikely to be rhetorical successes.367 Accordingly, the other
part of Sumner's defense of the market-blaming the poor for their
poverty-necessarily plays a much more important role in contem-
porary conservative rhetoric on the phenomenon of poverty. The
harsher aspect of that rhetorical strategy is manifest in outright
attacks on the poor as indolent or immoral. The less harsh aspect
of conservative rhetoric about poor people places direct responsi-
bility on the government for attempting to eliminate poverty in a
manner that leaves poor people materially deprived and morally
depraved.
Children, however, are especially resistant to both those
strategies. First, because they are incapable of taking care of
themselves, or at least the overwhelming social consensus is that
children cannot care for themselves; and second, because, for
purely sentimental reasons, children are appealing victims and
unlikely villains. Childhood and innocence, in modem American
culture, are largely synonymous.
The blaming the victim strategy evident in conservative
contentions about illegitimacy and indolence among the poor loses
its effectiveness when applied to poor children. Assertions that poor
children are responsible for their own poverty are likely to be
perceived as heartless and cruel. Moreover, because the contempo-
rary social understanding of childhood is that childhood is supposed
to be characterized by dependence, conservative indictments of
government poor relief programs as discouraging industry and self-
reliance seem seriously misplaced when applied to the problem of
child poverty. Indeed, when it comes to criticism of government
367 While biblical defenses of capitalism may not be terribly persuasive to
most Americans, nevertheless, the way in which the rise of the so-called
"Christian Right" has contributed to a resurgence of the defense of the market
economy from a religious or biblical perspective should not be ignored. News
accounts of the 1995 national convention of the Christian Coalition reported that
the greatest positive reaction from the participants was to a Black woman and
self-described former welfare recipient who triumphantly declared, "God is a
Capitalist." Jake Thompson, GOP Hopefuls Woo Christian Coalition, KAN. CITY
STAR, Sept. 9, 1995, at Al.
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assistance to poor children, the likelihood is that the public will
demand more and not less.
What, then, is the conservative critic of welfare and defender
of the market to do? Four responses are possible: (1) blame poor
parents for their children's poverty; (2) blame poor children for
their own poverty; (3) simply ignore the problem of child poverty;
and (4) claim to be assisting poor children while cutting off their
means of support.
To criticism of the first strategy, the bulk of this Article has
been devoted. What remains to discuss here is one additional
criticism: virtually all of the conditions upon poor relief proposed
or implemented by conservatives in the 104th Congress have one
incentive to compliance: reduction or termination of benefits.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan described the welfare legislation
passed in August 1996 by the 104th Congress as based upon the
premise that "'the behavior of certain adults can be changed by
making the lives of their children as wretched as possible.' 3 61 If
poor parents cannot find jobs or fail to comply with the various
conditions placed upon their receipt of AFDC and other poor relief
programs, they will be denied benefits and their children will be
without support.
The radical curtailment of federal poor relief programs has not
been limited to AFDC and food stamps, two programs most often
associated with "welfare." For example, in May 1996, the House
of Representatives passed House Bill 2406,369 the United States
Housing Act of 1996, which denies public housing and assistance
to any person "who, after the date of the enactment of this Act, has
been convicted of illegal possession with intent to sell any
controlled substance. '37" House Bill 2406 also makes persons in
recovery from alcohol and drug problems ineligible for any housing
36' Robert Pear, Senate Passes Welfare Measure, Sending It for Clinton's
Signature, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al (quoting the remarks of Senator
Moynihan).
369 H.R. 2406, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 142 CONG. REC. H4837-06
(1996)(enacted).
170 Id. § 105(d).
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or housing assistance designated for individuals with disabili-
ties.37'
If enacted into law, both provisions would have a profoundly
detrimental effect on poor people with children. Under the former
provision, a mother who had been convicted for possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, yet who has been free of drug use for
several years, found employment, and was trying to raise her
family in the best way she could, would be denied public housing
or housing assistance. Her children, then, would be denied shelter
assistance because of a mistake their mother made once in her life.
In the case of the second provision, a parent who was once an
intravenous drug user and contracted human immunodeficiency
virus ("HIV"), but has undergone rehabilitation, was pulling his or
her life together and was in need of public housing assistance for
the disabled, would be disqualified, despite the debilitating effects
of the acquired immune deficiency syndrome ("AIDS"), from
receiving such assistance.
The second rhetorical strategy for dealing with the problem of
child poverty has already been discussed, but it is nonetheless
worth noting that the "villainization of children is neither unknown
nor entirely ineffective in our culture." '372 In the past few years
a revolution in the approach to criminal justice policy for juveniles
has taken place.373 The distinguishing mark of that revolution is
a wholesale abandonment of rehabilitative or therapeutic ideals in
the treatment of juvenile offenders.374 Courts and prosecutors are
being ordered or given discretion to try younger and younger
children as adults.375 In some states, there is no minimum age
limit at which a child can be tried as an adult for certain specified
offenses.376 Longer and harsher sentences are being imposed on
311 Id § 102(12).
372 See generally Robert B. Acton, Note, Gubernatorial Initiatives and
Rhetoric of Juvenile Justice Reform, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 277 (1996) (surveying
gubernatorial proposals for a more punitive juvenile justice system).
313 Id. at 279.
374 Id. at 282.
171 Id. at 283-92.
376 Id. at 290 (discussing Missouri's judicial transfer statute).
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children,377 and the United States has still not committed itself to
banning the execution of children.37 The administrative segrega-
tion of child prisoners, from the adult prison population, has also
come under assault as "coddling" young offenders.379 The rhetoric
that has accompanied these changes has frequently depicted young
offenders as predatory animals.38 '
Despite those disturbing trends, as noted earlier, blaming poor
children for their poverty is unlikely to succeed as a rhetorical
strategy, especially since the poorest children in the United States
are the youngest children, most under the age of six.38 ' That
brings the discussion to the third strategy: simply ignoring the
problem of child poverty.
To some extent, simple denial of the real dimensions of child
poverty has been the operative strategy of the current assault on
poor relief programs in the United States. As noted above, while it
was entirely obvious that all of the various conditions placed upon
public assistance, learnfare, workfare, drug testing, time limits, etc.,
were based upon an incentive structure that denied already
inadequate assistance to the children of sanctioned adults, there has
been, except from progressives and child advocates, remarkably
little discussion of that fact.
In what may serve as an epitome of this strategy of denial,
during the first session of the 104th Congress, when President
Clinton vetoed two bills that would have ended the federal
entitlement to assistance to poor children and their families, the
Department of Health and Human Services conducted a study
demonstrating that the effect of such legislation would have been
to force at least 1.2 million children into poverty. In the summer of
1996, with a general election approaching and a mounting sense of
71 Id. at 293-98.
378 See WAR ON CRIME, supra note 9, at 133 (reporting that the United
States allows "the death penalty to be imposed against teenagers").
'" Fox Butterfield, Republicans Challenge Notion of Separate Jails for
Juveniles, N.Y. TiMES, June 24, 1996, at Al.
380 See Governor Tom Ridge, Address to the Joint Session of the
Pennsylvania General Assembly 4 (Jan. 23, 1994) (transcript on file with Journal
of Law and Policy) (referring to juvenile offenders as "youthful predators").
31 See supra Part II (discussing trends in child poverty).
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urgency that the President had to keep his 1992 campaign promise
to "end welfare as we know it," the White House refused to
conduct a similar assessment of the Republican-sponsored legis-
lation. According to press accounts, the senior senator from New
York, Patrick Moynihan, made three separate requests for such a
study and was rebuffed each time. Finally, the senator turned to a
private progressive think-tank, the Urban Institute, which estimated,
based upon Census Bureau data, that the legislation would force a
similar number of children (1.1 million) into poverty."2
On July 26, 1996, the same day on which the Urban Institute
Report was issued, President Clinton's press secretary, Mike
McCurry was asked at a press briefing about the Urban Institute
report.
Question: Republicans are saying that Clinton
will sign any welfare bill. He's dying
to sign it. He thinks this is what the
American people want. That's one
part of my question. And is the presi-
dent aware of the Urban Institute's
study that will show that one million
children will be thrown into poverty?
Mr. McCurry: He -
Question: Could he really accept a bill that
does that?
Mr. McCurry: The president can accept a bill that
has tough work requirements, that
helps ease the transition from welfare
dependency to work, that helps protect
kids who are going to be caught up in
that transition, to make sure that the
safety net is available to them, and in
many, many respects, we have moved
3.2 Matthew Rees, Clinton's Welfare Waffle, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 5,
1996, at 15.
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welfare reform in that direction. Now,
there is still a ways to go. We keep
acknowledging that. We keep saying
that we will watch very carefully what
the conference committee does. The
analysis that you referred to is not an
analysis of our government. It was
done by a private institute, and the
methodology of that analysis I cannot
vouch for.3"3
The evasiveness in McCurry's response is evident on its face.
McCurry begins with simple non-responsiveness; talking about
work requirements the president can accept without addressing the
question of what level of child poverty the president will not
accept. After offering some platitudes about there being "a way to
go" and careful monitoring of developments in the legislation,
McCurry then calls into question the accuracy of the report, without
mentioning that the report's conclusions were substantively
identical to those of an earlier study by a department of the
administration itself, or that the Clinton administration had refused
repeated requests for precisely the kind of study the Urban Institute
undertook. The central problem of child poverty, and the exacerb-
ating effect of changes in programs for poor relief for children, are
simply not engaged.
This example, taken from the Clinton administration as proof
that the conservative position on poor relief has adherents or at
least accomplices within the Democratic Party, illustrates well the
third rhetorical strategy of avoidance and denial. By simply
ignoring the problem of child poverty, by remaining silent about
the way in which proposed changes in the welfare system will
expand the numbers and worsen the conditions of poor children in
the United States, opponents of government assistance to the poor
are able to discourage or prevent public debate from wandering into
terrain that is inhospitable to the primary rhetorical strategies that
383 White House Briefing, July 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Fednew File.
CHILD POVERTY
the conservative position employs to make the poor seem responsi-
ble for their own poverty.
The fourth strategy for dealing with the problem of child
poverty is the one, as noted above, that has become ascendant in
conservative rhetoric about the abolition or radical curtailment of
poor relief programs; the language of compassion, sometimes
expressed as "tough love." This is the rhetoric of Speaker
Gingrich's book, To Renew America.384 In the opening paragraph
of his chapter on "Replacing the Welfare State with an Opportunity
Society," Speaker Gingrich writes:
The greatest moral imperative we face is replacing the
welfare state with an opportunity society. For every day
that we allow the current conditions to continue, we are
condemning the poor-and particularly poor children-to
being deprived of their basic rights as Americans. The
welfare state reduces the poor from citizens to clients. It
breaks up families, minimizes work incentives, blocks
people from saving and acquiring property, and over-
shadows dreams of a promised future with a present
despair born of poverty, violence, and hopelessness.385
Speaker Gingrich, of course, is the leader of those forces in the
U.S. House of Representatives who succeeded, in August 1996, in
abrogating a sixty-year commitment to guarantee a basic level of
cash and nutritional assistance to poor children.38 6 Notwithstand-
ing that fact, he adopts a tone of solicitousness toward the poor
more befitting Dorothy Day than Marie Antoinette.
The tone of Mr. Gingrich's rhetoric is echoed in remarks by
leading advocates of the abolition of poor relief programs.387
3" NEWT GINGRICH, To RENEW AMERICA (1996).
311 Id. at 76.
386 H.R. 3734, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (enacted).
387 See, e.g., Press Release of Rep. Bill Baker (R-Cal.) (Jul. 18, 1996)
(pouting Representative Baker's opinion that a new welfare proposal will open
doors of opportunity for millions of Americans allegedly trapped in a cycle of
welfare dependency); Press Release of Sen. Rod Grams (R-Minn.) (Dec. 22,
1995) (claiming that Senator Gram made efforts to preserve tax relief for
families in the budget agreement); Press Release of Rep. Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
(Dec. 12, 1995) (arguing that Senate action on welfare will reduce illegitimacy
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Thus Governor Tommy Thompson (R-Wis.) berated the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Milwaukee Rembert Weakland, and the
Wisconsin Catholic Conference, for their opposition to Republican
legislation to abolish the federal guarantee of assistance to poor
children and their families:
The entitlement the Wisconsin Catholic Conference wants
to protect so badly has done nothing but harm children for
the past 60 years. It is the padlock that has closed the gate
trapping families in a well of dependency and despair...
And the people harmed most severely by the AFDC (Aid
to Families with Dependent Children) "entitlement" have
clearly been the children.38
The flaw inherent in this rhetorical strategy has already been
identified: the public may take the language of compassion
seriously. When the empirical effects of present policies that
dramatically reduce or abolish assistance to poor adults and their
children have their anticipated effect-for example, an explosion in
the rates of child poverty-proponents of the rhetoric of compas-
sion may find themselves constrained to reinstitute the very
measures of government poor relief the abolition of which their
rhetoric was meant to facilitate.
The crisis for conservative rhetoric depends, of course, on the
realization of an empirical condition: that poor parents denied
assistance will be unable to find jobs or sources of private charity
to support themselves and their children. That eventuality, however,
is by no means far-fetched. As noted above, a number of credible
studies have already reached that conclusion.
Besides the disaster in human suffering that the impoverishment
of so many more children would represent, it would also represent
a rhetorical disaster for the conservative position on poor relief not
only because of the debilitating effect of the witness of so many
impoverished children on the moral legitimacy of the market
economy; not only because of the practical demands such an
increase in child poverty would make for expanded government
poor relief programs; but also because such a dramatic increase in
and promote work ethic).
388 Gov Swings Again at Archbishop, CAP. TIMEs, Jul. 10, 1996, at 3A.
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the numbers of poor children with parents unable to care for them
would expose one of the more glaring bits of intellectual dishonesty
within the conservative position on poor relief: the refusal to admit
the need for massive institutionalization of poor children. The
argument exposing that intellectual dishonesty has four premises.
Premise number one is that in our society there are three means
of providing care for children: the biological family, the foster or
adoptive family, and congregate or institutional care (for which the
traditional term was "orphanage").
Premise number two is that where the biological family fails the
foster or adoptive family is the next resource for providing child
care. In the case of the debate over AFDC, this would include all
those parents whose means of subsistence are terminated for failing
to comply with the various conditions or exhausting the time limits
placed upon federal assistance.
Premise number three is that there are not a sufficient number
of foster or adoptive families to absorb the number of children who
it is reasonably anticipated will be forced into destitution by the
recent abolition of the federal guarantee of a minimal level of cash
and nutritional assistance. The United States has approximately
420,000 children in foster care.389 Estimates of the number of
poor children whose parents will no longer be able to care for them
as a result of changes in federal poor relief programs range from
1.2 to 5.3 million. 39 It is generally agreed that it would be
impossible to place any significant fraction of the children
displaced from loss of AFDC benefits into foster care. That leaves
the third mode of child care in the United States: institution-
alization.
Premise number four is that supplying a sufficient number of
institutions to care for destitute children will constitute an economic
and humanitarian disaster. Congregate care facilities for poor
children, what were once termed "orphanages," house nearly 30,000
389 Douglas J. Besharov, Orphanages Aren't Welfare Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1994, at A23.
390 Id. See, e.g., Judy Mann, Welfare Cuts: Making the Children Pay, WASH.
POST, Dec. 6, 1995, at C26 (predicting that AFDC cuts will cause foster families
to become homeless and abusive to children).
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children nationwide.39" ' The average yearly cost of caring for a
child in a congregate facility is $36,000.00.392 In 1994, there
were 5.5 million families receiving AFDC. Those families were
comprised of 13,623,000 people, 9,224,000 of whom were
children.393 If only 10% of those families (550,000), a very
conservative estimate, have parents whose benefits are terminated
before the parent has found a job to support the family, the number
of children forced into destitution would be approximately 922,400.
Presuming that all those children will need to be placed in
congregate care facilities, the yearly cost of caring for those
children would be in excess of $33.2 billion, about $10 billion
more than all that was spent on AFDC in 1996.
The conclusion of the argument, then, is that advocates of the
conservative position on poor relief should be devoting considerable
energy to talking about the need for institutional care for poor
children, and working to supply adequate funding and material
resources in order to create a massive system of congregate care
facilities for poor children.
Such talk, however, will never be heard from opponents of
government poor relief programs. The reasons for that are partly
practical; the nation does not have the resources and the public
would not tolerate such massive expenditures on institutionalizing
poor children. There is also, however, a political reason for
avoiding such rhetoric: talk of orphanages for poor children
has proven to be highly unpopular with the American people.
House Speaker Gingrich learned that lesson early in the 104th
Congress and, since that time, has not revisited the subject.39 4
Therein lies the fundamental intellectual dishonesty of the
conservative position on child poverty and poor relief. Unable to
blame poor children for their own poverty and unwilling to
acknowledge the consequences of denying public assistance to poor
parents, the conservative advocates of abolishing the federal
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 216, at 1152.
391 Iowa Plan, supra note 355, at Al (reporting that Representative E. Clay
Shaw Jr., of Florida called House Speaker Newt Gingrich's recommendation of
orphanages"'an offhand remark,"' thus "'downplay[ing] the orphanage option').
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guarantee of some basic level of assistance to poor children and
their families are disabled from realistically facing, practically or
rhetorically, the problem of child poverty.
The logical incoherence, factual inconsistencies, and intellectual
dishonesty of the conservative position on poor relief generally and
child poverty specifically present progressives with an opportunity.
Focusing progressive rhetoric on the plight of children may well be
the most effective means by which to persuade the American public
that the poor are not responsible for their own poverty, and that
withdrawing what was, by any standard, rather meager assistance
from government poor relief programs was a terrible moral and
political mistake.
The danger in focusing upon children is that an emphasis on
their innocence, their lack of culpability in their own poverty, may
reinforce a sense that poor adults are to blame for being poor.
Acknowledging some poor people as deserving, implicitly affirms
that other poor people are undeserving. It would be a cruel irony
if progressives succeeded in restoring and expanding government
assistance to poor children, only to reinforce the unjustified animus
that now prevails toward childless adults and the poor parents of
poor children.
Contemporary defenders of the conservative position place their
faith in the market. For them the market exhibits the same
attributes as the God of monotheism: omnipotence and benevo-
lence. Whatever the problem-providing health care, ending
poverty, curing disease, protecting the environment, educating the
young-the market, the conservative position tells us, will provide.
There is simply nothing it cannot do, and what it does is good.
This cult of the market finds evidence of market failure--child
poverty the most morally egregious example of such fail-
ure-simply intolerable.
For those who reject that position, who believe that capitalism
does not and cannot adequately provide a decent level of material
existence for all human beings, among the most effective weapons
in the rhetorical arsenal is a simple empirical fact: like the gods of
old, the cult of the market demands the sacrifice of children.

